

THE PHILOSOPHY OF
THE KALAM

BY
HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON

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ceived by God.¹⁹ This utterance of the word "Be," a word which in Arabic consists of two consonants, *kāf* and *nūn*, constitutes two of five attributes²⁰ which are created in the essence of God by that eternal power of His whenever He creates a body or an accident in the world.²¹ The five attributes are: (1) a will (*irādah*) to produce the object to be produced; (2) the letter *kāf* and (3) the letter *nūn*, which are the two consonants of the Arabic word for "Be"; (4) vision, with which God will see the produced object, for if that vision were not created in Him, He could not see that object; (5) hearing, with which He will hear the produced object, if it is audible.²² To differentiate between that which is created and subsists in the essence of God and that which is created by God in the world, the former is described by the term *ḥādith* and the latter by the term *muhḍath*.²³

In our earlier discussion of the other two theories of attributes, we have shown how the orthodox Muslim affirmation of attributes corresponds to the orthodox Christian conception of the reality of the second and third persons of the Trinity and how the Mu'tazilite denial of attributes corresponds to the Sabellian denial of the second and third persons of the Trinity.²⁴ We may now add that the belief in created attributes by the Rāfidah and the Karrāmiyyah corresponds to the Arian conception of the createdness of the second and third persons of the Trinity, except that the Arian created persons are extradeical, whereas the created attributes are intradeical.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 205, ll. 1-2.

²⁰ The expression "five attributes (*ṣifāt*)" is used in *Nihāyat*, p. 114, l. 15, and p. 104, l. 11; cf. also reference to some of these five as "attributes" on p. 114, l. 4. In *Fark*, p. 204, l. 18, they are referred to as "many accidents," and so also on p. 205, ll. 1-3, the mention of the term *kun* is followed by the explanation "and this utterance by Himself consists of many letters, each one of which is an accident originating in Him."

²¹ *Fark*, p. 204, l. 18.

²² *Fark*, p. 205, ll. 1-5; *Nihāyat*, p. 114, ll. 15-16.

²³ *Nihāyat*, p. 104, l. 12-105, l. 1.

²⁴ Cf. above, p. 139.

IV. MODES

1. MU'AMMAR'S MA'NĀ *

The Muslim doctrine of attributes, being, as we have seen, a development of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, is ultimately a development, through Philo's Logos, of the Platonic theory of ideas. The orthodox affirmation of the reality of attributes represents the orthodox Christian conception of the Trinity and hence the orthodox Christian modification of the Philonic interpretation of the Platonic ideas. The Mu'tazilite denial of the reality of attributes represents the Sabellian conception of the Trinity and hence the Albinian interpretation of the Platonic ideas. But while all these are Platonic ideas by heredity, they are not always so by function. In Plato, the function of ideas was twofold, that of exemplar and that of cause. The attributes and pre-existent Koran are not exactly exemplars nor are they exactly causes of creation, though they are perhaps not altogether devoid of these functions. Still they are traceable to Platonic ideas. They are descendants of those denizens of a world beyond ours which in Plato were called ideas and which among the interpreters of Plato — Aristotle, Philo, Albinus, and Plotinus — became an object of discussion as to whether they were within God or outside of God and, if the latter, whether they were coexistent with God or brought into existence by Him.¹

In Islam, so far, these descendants of the Platonic ideas knew not their father nor those who quarreled among themselves about their patrimony. Whatever reflection of the Platonic ideas may be discerned in the discussions about attributes or about the Koran during the early part of the

* Reprinted with additions and revisions from *Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb* (1965), pp. 673-688.

¹ Cf. *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, I, pp. 252-286, and "Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretations of Platonic Ideas" in *Religious Philosophy*, pp. 27-68.

eighth century comes not directly from Greek philosophy but from the Church Fathers. But in the latter part of the eighth century, Greek philosophic works began to be translated. Plato's *Timaeus* was translated before 806, the *Republic* before 873, and the *Sophist* before 911. Other early sources of Platonism accessible to the Muslims were Porphyry's *Isagoge*, which was translated before 763; an abridgment of Plotinus' *Enneads*, known as the *Theology of Aristotle*, which was translated in 840; Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, which was translated before 911, probably together with Alexander's Commentary on it; and pseudo-Plutarch's *De Placitis Philosophorum*, which was translated before 912.² Undoubtedly, philosophic knowledge was transmitted orally to Muslim theologians even before philosophic works were translated, and it continued to be transmitted orally even after the work of translation had begun, as all this may be seen from the appearance of philosophic terms and phrases and apothegms and excerpts in the reports of the Muslim teachers of the eighth century. This new philosophic knowledge in its earliest appearance in the eighth century, and even for some time afterwards, was not as yet differentiated according to the various opposing schools of Greek philosophy to which it belonged. Statements of philosophers, however diverse in origin, were all treated as segments of a uniform system of thought called philosophy, as distinguished from another system of thought based upon the Koran and tradition. It was an eclecticism due at first to a lack of knowledge, which in the course of time grew into a conscious attempt at harmonization, such as found in Alfarabi's work entitled *Kitāb al-Jamī bayn Ra'y al-Hakīmayn Aflāṭūn al-Ilāhī wa-Aristūṭālīs*, "Book of the Agreement between the Opinions of Two Philosophers, the Divine Plato and Aristotle."

The influence of this new philosophic knowledge is soon discerned in the problem of attributes. It is first discerned in

² Cf. Steinschneider, *Die arabischen Übersetzungen aus dem Griechischen* (1897), s. v.

the ninth century in the various formulae by which the Mu'tazilites, in their denial of the existence in God of real attributes, sought to express their interpretation of the terms which are predicated of God. This will be dealt with by us later, in the section on the semantic aspect of the problem of divine attributes. Then it is discerned in the theory of modes, which appeared in the tenth century. This will be dealt with by us, again, later, in the section on Abū Hāshim's *ahwāl*. But Abū Hāshim's theory of modes, as we shall see, is only a revision of Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā* in the ninth century, though in itself Mu'ammār's theory may have no direct connection with the problem of attributes. We shall, therefore, prior to our discussion of the theory of modes, take up in this chapter Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā* and try to unfold the processes of reasoning by which, under the influence of this new philosophic knowledge derived from a variety of sources, Mu'ammār has arrived at his theory of *ma'nā*.

I shall first reproduce in chronological order the necessary reports on Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā* and then I shall discuss them.

The oldest reports on Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā* are in Ḥayyāt's *Intiṣār* and Ash'arī's *Maḳālāt*.

Ḥayyāt first quotes Ibn al-Rāwandī as saying that Mu'ammār "maintains that no single act is produced in the world but that there are produced simultaneously a thousand times thousand acts; yea, an infinity of other acts."³ He then explains it: "Know — and may God teach you what is good — that this view, which the author of the book [Ibn al-Rāwandī] reports as being that of Mu'ammār, is the theory with regard to the *ma'ānī*. The meaning of this theory may be explained as follows. Having observed that of two contiguous bodies at rest one begins to move, while the other does not, Mu'ammār inferred that a *ma'nā* must inevitably abide in the one and not in the other, and it is on account of

³ *Intiṣār* 34, p. 46, ll. 11-12.

that *ma'nā* that the former is moved, for were it not so, then the one would not be more capable of motion than the other. He further said: If this reasoning is sound, there must inevitably also be another *ma'nā* on account of which the motion abides in one of the bodies rather than in the other. He again said: Were it not so, then the abiding of the motion in one of the bodies would not be more appropriate than the abiding of it in the other. So also, he went on to say, if I were asked concerning the [second] *ma'nā* why it was the cause of the abiding of the motion in one of the bodies and not in the other, my answer would be: It is on account of another *ma'nā*. He finally said: So also, if I were further asked [the same question] concerning this [third] *ma'nā*, my answer would be with regard to this *ma'nā* like my answer with regard to the preceding *ma'nā* [and so on to infinity]."⁴

Two observations are to be made about Ḥayyāt's explanation. (1) The motion spoken of in it is a motion caused by some inner cause in the body of that which is set in motion, such, for instance, as what Aristotle calls the motion of generation and corruption in the category of substance or the motion of growth and diminution in the category of quantity or the motion of the various alterations in the category of quality or the natural upward and downward motions of things in the category of place. (2) As described in the report, two questions are raised by Mu'ammār, to which two answers are given by him, in each of which he makes use of the *ma'nā*. The first question is, why a body at rest begins to move. To this the answer given is that it is set in motion by a *ma'nā*. The second question is, why of two contiguous bodies at rest, each of them presumably possessing a *ma'nā*, one is moved by its *ma'nā* at a certain particular time, while the other remains at rest at that particular time, though presumably it will be moved by its *ma'nā* at some other time. To this the answer

⁴ *Ibid.*, ll. 16-24. My bracketed addition here is required by the opening statement of this report as well as by the other reports to be quoted. The brief reference to Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā* in *Intiḡār* 9, p. 22, ll. 18 ff. is discussed below.

given is that this is due to an infinite series of *ma'ānī*, for though such an infinite series of *ma'ānī* would presumably exist in both these contiguous bodies, it would differ in them in accordance with the difference in the time of the originations of these bodies. The combination of the two mentioned uses of the *ma'nā* leads to the conclusion that any motion that takes place in any particular body at any particular time is caused by an infinite series of *ma'ānī*. It is this conclusion, as briefly formulated by Ibn al-Rāwandī in terms of acts, that is quoted by Ḥayyāt at the beginning of his report.

More fully is the same theory reported by Ash'arī. "Some say that a body, when it is moved, is moved only on account of a *ma'nā*, which is the [cause of the] motion. Were it not for this, there would be no reason for this body, rather than for another body, to be moved, nor would there be any reason for this body to be moved at the time at which it is moved rather than to have been moved at some prior time. Since this is so, it may similarly be reasoned with regard to the motion that, if there was no *ma'nā* on account of which it was the motion of the body moved, there would be no reason for it to be the motion of that body rather than the motion of some other body. And so this *ma'nā* is a *ma'nā* of the motion of the body moved on account of still another *ma'nā*, but there is no totality and sum to the *ma'ānī*; and they take place at a single time. The same holds true of black and white, that is, of the fact that it is the black of one body rather than of another and that it is the white of one body rather than that of another. The same holds true of the difference (*muḥālafah*) between blackness and whiteness and similarly, according to them, does it hold true of other genera and accidents,⁵ that is

⁵ In the expression here "of other genera (*al-ajnās*) and accidents," the other accidents quite evidently mean accidents in addition to "blackness and whiteness" mentioned before. As for the other genera, it refers to "same," which is mentioned later together with "different" but is not mentioned before when he mentioned "difference." The description here of "different" and "same" as "genera" reflects Plato's description of "same" and "other" as *γένη*, "genera," in *Sophist* 254 E. But, while the term "gen-

to say, when two accidents are different (*iḥṭalafā*) or are the same (*ittifaḳā*), inevitably one must assume the existence of *ma'ānī* to which there is no totality. It is also their claim that the *ma'ānī* to which there is no totality are produced by an act of the place in which they abide. The same similarly holds true of the predicates 'living' and 'dead,' for when we predicate of a person that he is living or dead, we must inevitably assume an infinite number of *ma'ānī* which abide in him, for life cannot be life to him rather than to another except on account of a *ma'nā*, and that *ma'nā* [cannot be the *ma'nā* of that life rather than of another life except] on account of a *ma'nā*, and so on to infinity. This is the view of Mu'ammār."⁶

This report, which is introduced with the words "Some say" and closes with the words "This is the view of Mu'am-

mar" as a description of "different" and "same" is undoubtedly borrowed here from the *Sophist*, the terms meant to be included here under "genera" are not taken from the *Sophist*. To begin with, one of the genera here is "difference" (*muhālafah*), for which the Greek would be *διαφορά*, whereas the corresponding one of the genera in the *Sophist* is "other" (*ἄτερον*). Then, the expression "other genera" here quite evidently alludes to some genera in addition to the single other genus "same" mentioned thereafter, but among the five genera enumerated in the *Sophist*, namely, being, motion, rest, same, and other, there is none which could be added here to "same." The allusion to several genera here in the expression "other genera" is to the terms "same," "other," "different," "like," "contrary" discussed by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* V, 9-10. The Arabic translation of these chapters in the *Metaphysics* is missing in Bouyges' edition of *Averroes: Tafsir Ma ba'd at-Tabi'at* (1938-48), but in other parts of the *Metaphysics*, of which Bouyges' edition contains the Arabic translations, we get the Arabic for the following Greek terms:

- (1) *αὐτά*, *muttafiḳah*, "the same" (III, 4, 1000a, 21, Text. 15);
- (2) *τὸ ὅμοιον*, *al-mithl*, "the like" (V, 15, 1021a, 10, Text. 20);
- (3) *διαφορά*, *al-iḥṭilāf*, "difference" (X, 3, 1054b, 23, Text. 12);
- (4) *ἑτερότης*, *al-ghayriyyah*, "otherness" (*ibid.*);
- (5) *ἡ ἐναντιότης*, *al-diddiyyah*, "contrariety" (*ibid.*, 32, Text. 13).

The Arabic terms, it will be noticed, are the same as those used here by Ash'arī and later by Shahrastānī and Rāzī (cf. below at nn. 8 and 24).

⁶ *Maḳālāt*, p. 372, l. 2 - p. 373, l. 2. Again, an allusion to his theory of *ma'nā* is to be found in Mu'ammār's statement, quoted by Ash'arī, that "God creates a creation by a cause and there is a cause to that cause, but there is no limit and totality to the causes" (*Maḳālāt*, p. 253, ll. 3-4; cf. p. 364, ll. 12-13, and p. 511, ll. 8-9) and also in his statement, again quoted by Ash'arī, that "to that which ceases to exist there is a destruction and to this destruction there is another destruction, and so on without limit" (*Maḳālāt*, p. 367, ll. 5-6).

mar," makes it quite clear that Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā*, originally presented as an explanation of the difference in bodies with reference to motion, was taken by those "some" of his followers to have meant to serve also as an explanation of the difference or otherness or contrariety, as well as of the sameness and likeness, in bodies with reference to accidents in general, among which they included as accidents the predicates "living and dead," for, while "life" is said by Aristotle to be a "property" of "living being,"^{6a} the duration of life in any living being, which quite evidently is meant here by the term "living" in the contrasting predicates "living and dead," is to be considered as an accident in individual living beings, whose various durations of life are determined, according to Aristotle, by various causes.^{6b}

The same view is variously reported in the name of Mu'ammār by later authors, such as Baghdādī, Ibn Ḥazm, and Shahrastānī. Baghdādī reproduces Mu'ammār's view in two places in his *Fark*, and in one of the places his reproduction bears a resemblance to that which occurs later in Shahrastānī's *Milal*, which would make it seem that either Shahrastānī drew upon Baghdādī or Baghdādī and Shahrastānī drew upon a common source.

Both Baghdādī and Shahrastānī start with a general restatement of the main conclusion of Mu'ammār's view, which in Baghdādī reads that "every species of accidents existing in bodies is infinite in number,"⁷ and in Shahrastānī reads that "accidents are infinite in every species."⁸ The statement here by both Baghdādī and Shahrastānī that accidents, according to Mu'ammār, are infinite in number quite evidently refers to their statement subsequently that, according to Mu'ammār, each accident is caused by an infinite chain of *ma'ānī*. The inference, therefore, to be drawn from this is that the term "accidents" is used by them here in the sense of *ma'ānī*. A

^{6a} *Top.* V, 5, 134a, 32, and cf. *Soph. Elench.* 5, 167b, 33.

^{6b} *De Long. et Brev. Vitae* I-VI; *De Respiratione* XVII-XVIII.

⁷ *Fark*, p. 137, ll. 16-17.

⁸ *Milal*, p. 46, l. 15.

justification for their description of *ma'ānī* as accidents would seem to be found in the fact that one of the formal definitions of accident is that "it is always subsisting in a subject,"⁹ plus the fact that the infinite *ma'ānī*, according to Mu'ammār, subsist in the same subject as the accidents which are produced by them, so that it was quite natural to conclude that the *ma'ānī* also could be described as accidents.

Then both Baghdādī and Shahrastānī restate the reasoning by which Mu'ammār was led to his conclusion. In Baghdādī, Mu'ammār is represented as trying to show how motion, color, taste, smell, and any other accident require the existence of an infinite chain of *ma'ānī* in the subject of the motion and color and taste and smell as well as of any other accident.¹⁰ In Shahrastānī, he is represented simply as saying something to the effect that every accident requires the existence of a *ma'nā* and that this leads to an uninterrupted concatenation (*al-tasalsul*). In Shahrastānī, however, there is the additional statement that "on account of this view, Mu'ammār and his followers were called the partisans of *ma'ānī* (*aṣṣāb al-ma'ānī*)."¹¹

Finally, after these two passages quoted from Baghdādī and Shahrastānī, there are in both of them passages which reflect a common source. In Baghdādī the passage reads: "Al-Ka'bī, in his treatise, reports in the name of Mu'ammār that motion, according to him, differs from rest only in virtue of a *ma'nā* outside of it and in the same way rest differs from motion in virtue of a *ma'nā* outside of it, and that these two *ma'ānī* differ from two *ma'ānī* other than they. This reasoning, according to him, may go on to infinity."¹² The parallel passage in Shahrastānī reads: "And he [=Mu'ammār] adds thereto saying: motion differs from rest not in virtue of its essence but only in virtue of a *ma'nā* which necessitates the difference."¹³ Shahrastānī then continues: "By the same token,

⁹ Porphyry, *Isagoge*, p. 13, l. 5.

¹⁰ *Fark*, p. 137, l. 17-p. 138, l. 4.

¹¹ *Milāl*, p. 46, ll. 16-17.

¹² *Fark*, p. 183, ll. 4-8.

¹³ *Milāl*, p. 46, ll. 17-18.

the otherness (*mughāyarah*) between like things and the likeness (*mumāthalah*) between them and the contrariety (*taḍādd*) between two contrary things are all, according to his opinion, due to a *ma'nā*."¹⁴ This additional statement, which may be based upon the same treatise of Ka'bī, corresponds to the expression "other genera" used in the passage quoted above from Ash'arī,¹⁵ which we have explained to mean the extension by some followers of Mu'ammār of their master's theory of *ma'nā* from its original use as an explanation of the difference in bodies with reference to motion to its use as an explanation of "otherness" or "contrariety" as well as "sameness" and "likeness" in bodies with reference to accidents in general.¹⁶

In another place in his *Fark*, Baghdādī represents Mu'ammār as trying to show how the assumption of the existence of an infinite series of *ma'ānī* is required in order to explain why one person rather than another possesses a certain special kind of knowledge.¹⁷

Ibn Ḥazm reproduces Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā* in two places in his *Fiṣal*. In one of these places, he represents Mu'ammār as arguing from motion and rest and from the differences between accidents for the existence of *ma'ānī*, but, in the course of his exposition, he remarks that the *ma'ānī* are "existent things" (*ashyā' maujūdah*), and hence he says that from this Mu'ammār and his followers "conclude the existence in the world of an infinite number of things (*ashyā'*) at any given time."¹⁸ In the other place in his *Fiṣal*, he merely reports of Mu'ammār as saying that "in the world there are existent things (*ashyā' maujūdah*) to which there is no limit . . . and to which there is no measure and no number."¹⁹ In both these places he thus uses *ashyā'* as the equivalent of *ma'ānī*. Similarly, when he describes the persons of the Christian Trinity as *ashyā'*,²⁰ he uses *ashyā'* as the equivalent of *ma'ānī*, as these

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, l. 19.

¹⁵ Cf. above n. 5.

¹⁶ Cf. above, pp. 152-153.

¹⁷ *Fiṣal* I, p. 49, l. 1; cf. IV, p. 207, l. 22.

¹⁸ *Fark*, p. 181, ll. 12-17.

¹⁹ *Fiṣal* V, p. 56, ll. 15-22.

²⁰ *Ibid.* IV, p. 194, ll. 2-4.

two terms are also used by Yahyā b. 'Adī.²¹ Similarly, also, when Ash'arī is quoted by him as calling the attributes *ashyā'*,²² the term *ashyā'* is used as the equivalent of *ma'ānī*, for, in Shahrastānī, Ash'arī is quoted as calling them *ma'ānī*.²³

Drawing upon all these sources, Rāzī (d. 1209) presents the theory of *ma'nā* as follows: "Some of them maintain that two things which are mutually other (*al-ghayrayni*) are mutually other by means of a *ma'nā* and the same holds true of two like things (*al-mathalānī*) or two contrary things (*al-diddānī*) or two different things (*al-muḥtalifānī*). In proof of this they argue that the statement that black and white are black and white does not mean the same as the statement that they are mutually other and different and contrary, and in proof that the two statements are not the same they argue from the fact that otherness and difference and contrariety occur also in other things [besides blackness and whiteness]. It is thus evident that otherness is not something negative: it is rather something positive; and so it has been established that two things which are mutually other (*al-mutaghāyirayni*) are mutually other by means of a *ma'nā*. By the same token two things which are alike correspond to each other (*muḥābilānī*) by means of a *ma'nā*. They then argue that this *ma'nā* must inevitably be other than anything else, whence it follows that its otherness from anything else is [due to] to a [second] *ma'nā* existing by means of the [first] *ma'nā*. Now this [second] *ma'nā* must inevitably be either like another *ma'nā* or other than it and different from it. But [as shown before] its likeness as well as its otherness and difference is [due to] a [third] *ma'nā* existing by means of the [second] *ma'nā*. And the same reasoning is to be applied to this *ma'nā* as it was to the one before it, whence there results the assertion of an infinite number of *ma'ānī*."²⁴ Ṭūsī (d. 1273) in his comment upon this passage of Rāzī identifies the view described therein as that of "Mu'ammār and others" and restates Rāzī's con-

²¹ Cf. above, p. 117.

²² *Ibid.* IV, p. 207, l. 13.

²³ *Nilāyāt*, p. 181, l. 4.

²⁴ *Muḥaṣṣal*, p. 104, ll. 2-8.

cluding statement as a view which maintains that "accidents exist by means of accidents up to infinity," in which the *ma'ānī* are thus called "accidents."²⁵

From all this we gather that Mu'ammār was troubled by the question why things differ from each other. The differences between things mentioned by him, according to the two earliest reports of his view, are motion and rest, blackness and whiteness, and life and death. According to one of these earliest reports, he was troubled also by the question as to what accounts for the difference between accidents and the sameness of accidents, mentioning especially the accidents of blackness and whiteness. The answer given by him is that things differ and accidents both differ and are the same because of what he calls *ma'nā*. This *ma'nā* is described by him as abiding in bodies, from within which it acts as the cause of motion and rest and all the other accidents of the bodies in which it abides. Mu'ammār is further reported to have said that at any given moment that an accident is produced in a body by a *ma'nā*, there is behind that *ma'nā* an infinite chain of *ma'ānī*. In later reports, the *ma'ānī* are also called *ashyā'*, "things," and, evidently because they exist in bodies as their subject, they are also called "accidents."

We thus find that Mu'ammār has raised a question, the like of which was not raised by any other of his contemporary Mutakallimūn, and this question is answered by him by an elaborate theory, which is couched in language bristling with terms easily recognizable as reflecting Greek philosophic terminology.

The first thing, then, we should like to know is how it happened that of all of his contemporaries Mu'ammār alone was troubled by the question of why things are different or the same. All his contemporaries, we imagine, would simply say that this is how they are made by God. Why then did not Mu'ammār say the same thing?

In attempting to explain this peculiarity about the question

²⁵ Ṭūsī on *Muḥaṣṣal*, p. 104, n. 2, ll. 1-2. Cf. above at nn. 7, 8, 9.

raised by Mu'ammār, let us assemble all the bits of information that we have of Mu'ammār's philosophy and see whether we cannot find among them something which impelled him to raise his question.

We know that Mu'ammār, like nearly all the Mutakallimūn, was an atomist. In fact, he is reported to have believed that the atom itself is not a body,²⁶ but that eight atoms make up a body.²⁷ How atoms came into existence we are told in his name: they were created by God.²⁸ We are similarly told in his name how bodies come into existence — they are also created.²⁹ Accidents, however, we are told in his name, are not created by God³⁰ but that "when the atoms are aggregated, accidents follow by necessity; the atoms produce them by the necessity of [their] nature, each atom by its own self producing whatever accident resides in it,"³¹ or that accidents are "the action of substances (i. e., atoms) by their nature,"³² or that "any accident of a body comes from the action of the body by its nature."³³ From the combination of these passages we may gather that in every atom there resides a nature, and it is this nature that produces accidents when atoms are aggregated and form a body. Elsewhere Mu'ammār says in effect that bodies are perceptible only through their accidents.³⁴ Among the accidents mentioned as being produced by the atoms when they are formed into a body or as being produced by the body formed out of atoms are "life," "death," "color," "taste," and "smell."³⁵ It can similarly be shown that "motion" is also an act of the body in accordance with its nature, for it is reported of him that, in opposition to those who said that the motion in a moving

²⁶ *Maḳālāt*, p. 307, ll. 10-12.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 303, l. 9.

²⁸ *Maḳālāt*, p. 548, l. 10; *Fiṣāl* IV, p. 194, ll. 9-13; *Fark*, p. 136, l. 18-p. 137, l. 1; *Milāl*, p. 46, ll. 3-4.

²⁹ *Maḳālāt*, p. 303, ll. 10-11.

³⁰ *Fark*, p. 136, l. 15; cf. *Milāl*, p. 46, l. 4; *Fiṣāl* IV, p. 194, ll. 12-13.

³¹ *Maḳālāt*, p. 362, ll. 7-8: "Only accidents of a body are perceived; as for body, it cannot be perceived."

³² *Ibid.*, p. 548, ll. 11-12; *Fiṣāl* IV, p. 194, ll. 9-12.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 548, ll. 9-10.

³⁴ *Milāl*, p. 46, ll. 3-4.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 548, l. 12.

body is produced by God, he maintained that "the moving body produces it within itself,"³⁶ by which he quite evidently means that it produces it within itself in accordance with its nature, though, in the case of living beings, he says that their "motion and rest and aggregation and segregation" are "of the creations of bodies," not "by nature" (*ṭab'an*) but "by choice" (*iḥtiyāran*). It is to be noted, however, that, while in these passages, as well as in the passages quoted above, Mu'ammār speaks of both the motion and the rest of bodies, there is another passage where, evidently in opposition to the view current in the Kalam that "the modes of being (*al-akwān*) are motion and rest and aggregation and segregation,"³⁷ he says that "all modes of being (*al-akwān*) consist of rest and that some of them are called motions only in language and not in truth."³⁸ It may be remarked that this denial of motion and its description as being only in language and not in truth reflect the statement in pseudo-Plutarch's *Placita* that "Parmenides, Melissus, and Zeno deny that there are any such things as generation and corruption, for they suppose that the All is immovable,"³⁹ plus the distinction said to have been made by Parmenides between one part of philosophy which deals with "truth" and another which deals with "opinion."⁴⁰

We thus know that, according to his own philosophy, no accident, whether motion or rest or color or taste or smell or life or death, is produced in bodies by God; all accidents are

³⁶ *Milāl*, p. 46, ll. 4-6. So also the statement that Mu'ammār "was accustomed to say that man has no action other than will (*al-irādah*) and that all the other accidents are the actions of bodies by nature" (*Fark*, p. 138, ll. 16-17) is to be understood to mean that in man accidents are the work of the body by will, whereas in inanimate things accidents are the work of the body by nature.

³⁷ *Irshād*, p. 10, ll. 9-10; *Moreh*, I, 73, Prop. 1; cf. M. Schreiner, *Der Kalam in der jüdischen Literatur* (1895), p. 45, n. 3.

³⁸ *Maḳālāt*, p. 347, ll. 9-10; cf. p. 355, ll. 1-2; Ibn Ḥazm, *Fiṣāl* IV, p. 204, ll. 4-5.

³⁹ Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* I, 24, 1, p. 320a, ll. 11-13; Arabic translation in *Aristotelis De Anima et Plutarchi De Placitis Philosophorum*, ed. Badawi, 1954, p. 120, ll. 14-15.

⁴⁰ Diogenes Laertius, *De Vita et Moribus Philosophorum* IX, 22.

produced by the nature of the atoms which make up bodies or, as he loosely also says, by the nature of bodies. With this his view as to the origin of accidents, the question, as was to be expected, occurred to him, What is that "nature" which in bodies formed of atoms produces such a variety of accidents? As we shall see later,⁴¹ a similar question was raised by Nazzām, who, like Mu'ammār, believed that things have a nature; his answer, however, is different.

This is the reason why Mu'ammār was troubled by the question as to the origin of likenesses and differences in things occasioned by the variety of accidents.

The answer to this question, we shall now try to show, he found in the new philosophic knowledge which he had acquired either by reading or by hearsay.

From Aristotle's definition of nature as that which is "a certain principle and cause of motion and rest to that in which it is primarily inherent essentially and not according to accident"⁴² he has gathered that any event in the world which Aristotle calls motion has an inner cause which he calls nature. This view is adopted by him and is expressed in his above-quoted various statements to the effect that bodies are moved by their nature.

But, though in those quoted statements Mu'ammār makes use of Aristotle's terms "motion" and "nature," he differs from Aristotle in the meaning of both these terms.^{42a} To Aristotle, with his belief in a matter conceived of as potentiality, motion is a transition from potentiality to actuality⁴³ and the inner cause of that transition, which he calls nature, is identified by him with form,⁴⁴ which form itself, in the continuous course of motion, is changed from being something actual with reference to a matter preceding it into being something potential

⁴¹ Cf. below, pp. 561 ff.

⁴² *Phys.* II, 1, 192b, 20-23.

^{42a} The explanation given here for Mu'ammār's substitution of the term *ma'nā* for "nature" differs from the explanation given by me in the article published in the volume in honor of Gibb, pp. 62-63.

⁴³ *Phys.* III, 1, 201a, 10-11.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* II, 1, 193b, 3-5.

with reference to a form following it. To Mu'ammār, however, with his adherence to the Kalam theory of atoms, there is no potential matter, and hence there is no form conceived of as the opposite of matter. To him, as to all the Mutakallimūn who believed in atoms, the Aristotelian contrast of matter and form is replaced by the contrast of atom and accident. Motion, therefore, to him is not a transition from potentiality to actuality; it is a succession from one state of actual existence to another state of actual existence.^{44a} And so the term nature, which he retained in some of his statements, quite evidently using it in a sense of his own, had to be replaced by some term which had the meaning of actual existence. In the course of his search for such a term, he hit upon the term *ma'nā*. Now ever since the rise of the problem of attributes, as we have seen,⁴⁵ this term *ma'nā*, as a translation of the Greek term *πρᾶγμα*, "thing," and along with it the term *ṣifāh*, as a translation of the Greek term *τὸ χαρακτηριστικόν* had been used by the Attributists in the sense of something which has real existence, in this case real existence in God. What Mu'ammār did was to take the term *ma'nā*, which as a Mu'tazilite he denied to be something of real existence in God, and make it something of real existence in things. As a result of this, the two terms, *ṣifāh* and *ma'nā*, which had started together on their technical career in Islam, parted company and each of them carved out for itself a different career as a technical term. The term *ṣifāh* retained the meaning it acquired in its connection with the problem of attributes and thus formed part of the expression *aṣḥāb al-ṣifāt*,⁴⁶ "partisans of attributes," used as the equivalent of the term *al-ṣifātiyyah*,⁴⁷ "Attributists," whereas the term *ma'nā* formed part of the expression *aṣḥāb al-ma'ānī*,⁴⁸ "Partisans of *ma'ānī*," used as a description

^{44a} "Motion," as defined by the Mutakallimūn, "is the transition of an atom belonging to those [atomic] particles [which constitute a body] from one atom [of the distance over which the body moves] to another atom next to it" (*Morab* I, 73, Prop. 3, p. 137, ll. 1-2). Cf. below, p. 494 at n. 55.

⁴⁵ Cf. above, pp. 115 f.

⁴⁶ *Maḳālāt*, p. 171, l. 12.

⁴⁷ *Milāl*, p. 64, l. 5.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 46, l. 17.

of Mu'ammār and those who agreed with him in this particular theory of his.

Then, by a continuation of that kind of reasoning by which he had arrived at the existence of a *ma'nā* as the cause of the motion in a body, Mu'ammār arrived at the conclusion that each *ma'nā* must be preceded by a series of infinite *ma'ānī*, the result thus being that in this world of ours, which to Mu'ammār was created, there were various series of infinite *ma'ānī*. It is this conception of infinite *ma'ānī* that became the target of attack by the opponent of this theory of his.

The attack was on two main grounds. First, argues Baghdādī in his *Fark*, the conception of an infinite number of *ma'ānī* in a world created by God is contrary to the Koranic statement about God that "He counted all things in number" (72:28),⁴⁹ and so also Ibn Ḥazm quotes against it the Koranic statement about God that "with Him everything is in measure" (13:9).⁵⁰ Second, having in mind his own description of Mu'ammār's *ma'ānī* as accidents,⁵¹ again in his *Fark*, Baghdādī argues as follows: "If, now, Mu'ammār says that the combination of infinite accidents in a body is possible, he cannot refute the claim of the followers of appearance (*ẓuhūr*) and hiding (*kumūn*) that it is possible for infinite accidents of the kind called appearance and hiding to be in one and the same abode. But this view carried to its legitimate conclusion leads to the assertion of the eternal pre-existence (*qīdam*) of accidents — which is a heresy."⁵² The "followers of appearance and hiding" referred to by Baghdādī in this passage of his *Fark* are that group of the Dahriyyah, described as "Eternalists" (*ʿazaliyyah*), who in his *Uṣūl* are quoted by him as saying that "the accidents are eternally pre-existent (*qadīmah*), except that they hide in bodies and appear."⁵³ It is this same group of Dahriyyah, we may assume, that Ibn Ḥazm has reference to when, having in mind his own description of Mu'ammār's *ma'ānī* as things,⁵⁴ says that "the Dahriyyah agree with Mu'am-

⁴⁹ *Fark*, p. 138, l. 10.

⁵⁰ *Fīṣal* IV, p. 194, l. 6.

⁵¹ Cf. above at nn. 7–9.

⁵² *Fark*, p. 139, ll. 14–18.

⁵³ *Uṣūl*, p. 55, ll. 12–13.

⁵⁴ Cf. above at nn. 18–23.

mar in their assertion of an infinite number of things."⁵⁵ It is to be noted that neither Baghdādī nor Ibn Ḥazm accuses Mu'ammār of actually assenting to the theory of "appearance and hiding" and hence of also believing in the eternity of accidents, which means the eternity of the world. All they both try to say is that the assertion of an infinity of *ma'ānī* implies the assertion of their eternity, and hence Mu'ammār, who believes in the creation of the world, contradicts himself.^{55a} Later, in my discussion of the theory of appearance and hiding,⁵⁶ to which I refer as the theory of latency, I try to show three things: (1) that this theory started as an attempt to restate in popular language Aristotle's theory of the eternity of motion as an eternal process of transitions from potentiality to actuality and (2) that, when Naẓẓām adopted it, he adjusted it to his belief in the creation of the world; I also try to show (3) that, though Mu'ammār, too, had a theory of appearance and hiding, his theory had nothing in it of the Aristotelian theory of potentiality and actuality.

All the foregoing reports on Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā*, it will have been noticed, deal only with its application to created beings. In none of them is there any suggestion that the theory was applied by Mu'ammār also to God. As a Mu'tazilite, he could hardly be expected to apply it to God, inasmuch as such an application would mean the assertion of the existence in God of *ma'ānī* which would cause the existence in Him of attributes. Surprising, therefore, is it to find in Ash'arī a statement which reads as follows: "It is reported of Mu'ammār that he said that God is knowing in virtue of knowledge and that His knowledge is knowledge to Him in virtue of a *ma'nā* and that there is a *ma'nā* to a *ma'nā* to

⁵⁵ *Fīṣal* IV, p. 194, l. 7.

^{55a} Ibn al-Rāwandī, as quoted by Ḥayyāt (*Intiṣār* 7, p. 21, ll. 11–12), testifies that Mu'ammār, together with some other Mu'tazilites, held that "it is conceivable that the body [of the world] is in motion from eternity and that its motion is created," a sort of conception of eternal creation analogous to the Plotinian and the Christian conception of eternal generation. Ḥayyāt, however, denies the truth of Ibn al-Rāwandī's testimony (*ibid.*, ll. 13 ff.).

⁵⁶ Cf. below, pp. 498 ff.

infinity. And so was also his view with regard to the other attributes." But evidently being in doubt as to the authenticity of the report, Ash'arī adds: "Concerning this I was told by Abū 'Amr al-Furātī in the name of Muḥammad b. 'Īsā al-Ṣairāfi that this is what Mu'ammār said."⁵⁷

According to Baghdādī, however, Mu'ammār "denied the eternal attributes of God, just as the rest of the Mu'tazilites denied them,"⁵⁸ and similarly, according to Shahrastānī, he was "the greatest" among those who argued for "the remotion of attributes."⁵⁹

This is what seems to me to be the origin and meaning of Mu'ammār's theory of *mā'nā*. Essentially Mu'ammār's theory of *mā'nā* is Aristotle's theory of nature, which he adopted as a substitution for his rejected Kalam theory that every event in the world is directly created by God, but in which the term *mā'nā* was substituted by him for the term nature because of his rejection of Aristotle's theory of matter and form which was involved in the term "nature."

Let us now consider two other interpretations, that of Horovitz⁶⁰ and that of Horten.⁶¹

Horovitz finds that Mu'ammār's theory of *mā'nā* is based solely upon Plato's theory of ideas as represented in *Sophist* 254 B – 256 E. We shall reproduce here his arguments in support of his interpretation and comment upon each of these arguments.

First, basing his interpretation on the reports in Shahrastānī, Baghdādī, and Ibn Ḥazm, for Ḥayyāt's *Intiṣār* and Ash'arī's *Maḳālāt* had not as yet been published, Horovitz takes the terms "motion," "rest," "otherness," "likeness," and "contrariety" used in Shahrastānī's restatement of Mu'ammār's argument for *mā'nā* to reflect the last four of the terms

⁵⁷ *Maḳālāt*, p. 168, ll. 9–12.

⁵⁸ *Milal*, p. 46, ll. 1–2.

⁵⁹ S. Horovitz, *Kalam* (1909), pp. 44–54.

⁶¹ M. Horten, "Die sogenannte Ideenlehre des Muammār," *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, 15: 469–483 [1909]; *Die philosophischen Systeme der spekulativen Theologen im Islam* (1912), pp. 277–278.

⁵⁸ *Fark*, p. 137, ll. 5–6.

"being," "motion," "rest," "same," and "other" used in the *Sophist* in the argument for ideas.

That Mu'ammār knew the *Sophist* we have shown by his use, in Ash'arī's reproduction of his theory, of the term "genera" as a description of "same" and "difference."⁶² But at the same time we have also shown how his use of the term "difference" rather than the term "other" and how also his use of the plural "genera" in the expression "and other genera," when it is followed by only one genus, indicate that what he really had in mind was a list of terms enumerated by Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* and that only the designation of these terms as "genera" was borrowed from the *Sophist*. To this list of terms in the *Metaphysics*, we have further shown, belong also the terms "otherness," "likeness," and "contrariety" used by Shahrastānī. We have similarly shown an Aristotelian origin for the terms "motion" and "rest" used by Mu'ammār, according to all the restatements of his theory. Finally, the use of the term "accidents" in Ash'arī's restatement of Mu'ammār's theory, as well as in later restatements, is definitely of an Aristotelian, and not of a Platonic, origin.

Second, quoting from Shahrastānī the statement that "accidents are infinite in every species," Horovitz takes it to reflect the statement in *Sophist* 256 E that "in each of the species being is many and not-being is infinite in multitude" and interprets the term "accidents" in Shahrastānī's statement to mean the same as the term "not-being" in Plato's statement, and this on the ground of a statement by Maimonides to the effect that, according to the Kalam, the negation of an accident is an accident,⁶³ whence, presumably, Plato's "not-being" was changed by Mu'ammār to "accidents."

Perhaps one would have had to resort to this explanation if the statement, as phrased by Shahrastānī, had actually been used by Mu'ammār and if, moreover, it had been used by him in addition to, and as something different from, his statement that the *mā'ani* are infinite in number. But, as we have seen,

⁶² Cf. above n. 5.

⁶³ *Moreh* I, 73, Prop. 4, p. 138, ll. 8–17.

the statement about the infinity of accidents occurs in neither of the two oldest reports of Mu'ammār's theory, namely, those by Ḥayyāt and Ash'arī. As I have suggested above, the statement about the infinity of accidents both in Shahrastānī and Baghdādī, just as the similar statement in Ṭūsī, represents a later substitution for Mu'ammār's original statement about the infinite number of *ma'ānī*. As for Mu'ammār's own statement, it is based, as we have shown, upon his own reasoning.

Third, Horovitz takes the expression *aṣḥāb al-mā'ānī*, which, according to Shahrastānī, was applied to Mu'ammār and his followers, to reflect the expression οἱ εἰδῶν φίλοι, "the friends of ideas," in *Sophist* 248 A.

There is nothing peculiar about *aṣḥāb al-mā'ānī* to have to be explained by οἱ εἰδῶν φίλοι, of which, by the way, it is not a literal translation. The use of *aṣḥāb* in combination with some other term as a description of partisans or followers of some theory is common in Arabic, and in Ash'arī's *Maḳālāt* there occur seventeen such combinations.⁶⁴

Finally, the problem here is not solely the origin of certain terms or expressions used by Mu'ammār in the exposition of his theory of *ma'nā*; the problem is the origin and meaning of the theory itself. With regard to this, quite definitely, his theory of *ma'nā* is not the same as the theory of ideas in the *Sophist*. *Ma'nā* is represented by Mu'ammār as existing only in bodies; the ideas have an existence apart from bodies — a criticism already raised by Horten against Horovitz' interpretation of the *ma'nā* theory.

Now for Horten's own interpretation of Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā*. He takes it to have been formed under the influence of what he describes as the Vaiśeṣika category of inherence in Indian philosophy.

Horten, it may be remarked, while claiming an Indian origin for Mu'ammār's theory, does not claim that any of the terms used by Mu'ammār in the exposition of his theory reflect some term in any of the languages through which the

⁶⁴ Cf. Index to *Maḳālāt*, pp. 55–56.

Vaiśeṣika theory could have been transmitted to him. In contradistinction to this, as we have seen, every term used in connection with Mu'ammār's theory can be shown to have come from the Greek. Consequently, unless it is absolutely impossible to explain the theory of *ma'nā* on the basis of a Greek origin, there is no need of resorting to the assumption of an Indian origin.

Since the time of Horovitz and Horten, as far as I know, two other scholars, Tritton and Nader, have dealt with Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā*. Tritton refers to both Horovitz and Horten. The interpretation of Horovitz is dismissed by him as follows: "This is ingenious and meets the case; there is no evidence for it and it must stand on its own merits."⁶⁵ The interpretation of Horten is approved of by him as follows: "Indian influence in other branches of knowledge is certain so it is not surprising to find it in philosophy, even if undigested."⁶⁶ Nader interprets Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā* as a sort of Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason.⁶⁷

2. ABŪ HĀSHIM'S AḤWĀL

About a century after Mu'ammār, speculation on the question raised by Mu'ammār and his followers led Abū Hāshim to a criticism of Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā* and to a new theory, to be referred to as the theory of modes (*aḥwāl*).¹

⁶⁵ A. S. Tritton, *Muslim Theology* (1947), p. 101, n. 2.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁶⁷ Albert N. Nader, *Le Système Philosophique des Mu'tazila* (1956), pp. 208–210, under the chapter heading: "Le Principe de Raison Suffisante."

¹ In Arabic dictionaries, *ḥāl*, singular of *aḥwāl*, is translated as "state," "condition," "circumstance," "position," "present time." In connection with the problem of attributes, modern scholars from the earliest time adopted the term "state" as its translation: Schmolders, *Essai* (1842), p. 150: "état"; Haarbrücker, *Scharastani's Religionspartheien*, I (1850), p. 83: "Zustand"; Munk, *Guide*, I, 51 (1856), p. 185: "conditions," but *Melanges* (1859), p. 328: "condition, état ou circonstance"; Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology* (1903), p. 160: "states"; Horovitz, *Der Einfluss der griechischen Philosophie auf die Entwicklung des Kalam* (1909), p. 57: "Zustand." This translation is followed by many later scholars. But the term "mode" is used by the following: de Boer, *Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam* (1901), p. 54, "Zustände oder Modi"; Horten, "Die Modus-Theorie des abū Hāschim" in *ZDMG*, 63: 303 ff. (1909); Nader, *Mu'tazila*, p. 211: "le mode." I have

Once he had developed this theory of modes as a general theory of predication, he applied it to the problem of divine attributes, arriving at a view opposed at once to that of the Attributists and to that of the Antiattributists.

We shall deal first with his general theory of modes and then with its application to the problem of attributes.

Baghdādī, who was himself an Ash'arite and refers to Ash'arī as "our master" (*shayḥunā*),² introduces Abū Hāshim's theory of modes with the statement that this view "was considered heretical by his fellow Mu'tazilites as well as by other sects."³ He then quotes two reports as to the origin of the theory of modes.

Both reports open with an announcement to the effect that they are going to explain "what forced" Abū Hāshim into his theory of *aḥwāl*. Their common explanation is that he was forced into it by a criticism of Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā*. Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā* is then presented in both these reports as an attempt to answer a question which in the first report is quoted as a question put "by our fellow orthodox (*aṣḥābunā*) to the old Mu'tazilites"⁴ and in the second report is quoted as a question raised by Mu'ammār himself.⁵ The question as phrased in the first report reads, "whether he who is knowing among us differs from him who is ignorant, with regard to his knowledge, in virtue of himself or in virtue of some [external] cause,"⁶ and as phrased in the second report reads, "whether the knowledge of Zayd belongs to him rather than to 'Amr in virtue of himself or in virtue of a *ma'nā* or neither in virtue of himself nor in virtue of a *ma'nā*."⁷ The answer as clearly stated in the first report and as implied in the second report is that it is neither in virtue of himself nor in virtue of some external cause but in virtue of a *ma'nā*. Two

chosen to use the term "mode," though, as will be shown later in Appendix III, the term was originally used by Abū Hāshim in the sense of "disposition" and then he extended its meaning and used it in the sense of "state."

² *Fark*, p. 200, ll. 6-7.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 180, ll. 17-18.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 181, l. 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, ll. 11-12.

⁶ *Ibid.*, ll. 1-2.

⁷ *Ibid.*, ll. 12-13.

criticisms of this conclusion are briefly and only allusively reported. One of these criticisms reads that "if it is in virtue of a *ma'nā*, then Mu'ammār would be right in his assertion that one *ma'nā* is connected with another *ma'nā* up to infinity."⁸ Abū Hāshim's objection to an infinity of *ma'ānī* is quite evidently based upon the Koranic teaching about God that "He counteth all things in number (72:28)."⁹ As a result of his criticisms of Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā*, Abū Hāshim was led to his new theory which as phrased in the first report reads that "he who is knowing differs from him who is ignorant only in virtue of a *ḥāl* in which he is [that is to say, by his being disposed to knowledge]"¹⁰ and as phrased in the second report reads that "knowledge belongs to Zayd [who is the knower] in virtue of a *ḥāl* [that is to say, by a disposition]."¹¹

What follows this account of how the theory of *aḥwāl* arose differs in the two reports. In the first report what follows is a passage which is introduced as a sort of conclusion from what has preceded. To quote: "And so he established the *ḥāl* with reference to three situations. The first situation is that in which a subject is described by a certain predicate in virtue of the subject itself, and the subject deserves the predicate in virtue of a *ḥāl* in which it is [that is to say, by being disposed to it]. The second situation is that in which a subject described by a certain thing as its predicate in virtue of a *ma'nā* has come to possess that *ma'nā* in virtue of a *ḥāl*. The third situation is that in which the subject deserves a certain pred-

⁸ *Ibid.*, ll. 14-15. In the printed edition of the *Fark*, this criticism appears only, and as the only criticism, in the second report. But the opening words in the printed edition of the only criticism in the first report, which reads "and it necessarily follows also," shows that it was preceded by a missing other criticism. This missing criticism is included in Horten's German translation of Baghdādī's first report from a Berlin manuscript (cf. his "Neues zur Modustheorie des abu Hāschim," p. 49).

⁹ Cf. below, p. 470, n. 25.

¹⁰ For the technical meaning of the underlying Arabic expression *li ḥāl kāna 'alayhā* upon which this bracketed interpretation is based, see below, Appendix III.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, l. 17.

icate neither in virtue of itself nor in virtue of a *ma'nā*, but possesses that predicate rather than some other predicate, according to Abū Hāshim, in virtue of a *ḥāl*.”¹² On the basis of a twofold division of Abū Hāshim's modes reported by Juwaynī¹³ and by Shahrastānī,¹⁴ it can be shown, I believe, that the threefold division reported here by Baghdādī refers respectively (1) to modes in the sense of predicates which are properties, (2) to modes in the sense of predicates which are certain accidents in living beings, and (3) to modes in the sense of predicates which are genera or species. Thus Abū Hāshim's theory of modes as a general theory of predication applies to four of the five predicables enumerated by Porphyry.

It is probably because modes are terms predicated of a subject and all terms predicated of a subject, except proper names, are universal terms that the term modes (*aḥwāl*) came to be used by Abū Hāshim and his followers in the sense of universals. Such a use of the term *aḥwāl* is directly mentioned by Ghazālī in his statement that “the intellectual faculty apprehends the general intellectual universals, which the Mu'takalimūn call modes.”¹⁵ It is so also directly mentioned by Maimonides in his use of the expression “modes, that is, universal concepts (*al-mā'ānī al-kulliyyah*).”¹⁶ It is implied in a statement by Ibn Ḥazm which reads that “one of the absurdities of the Ash'arites is their assertion that it is possible for men to believe in modes and [universal] concepts (*al-mā'ānī [al-kulliyyah]*) which are neither existent nor non-existent.”¹⁷ It is similarly implied in a statement by Averroes which reads that “those who deny modes (*al-aḥwāl*) deny the belief in existence in general and color in general, whereas those who affirm modes say that existence in general and color in general are neither existent nor nonexistent.”¹⁸ This nega-

¹² *Ibid.*, ll. 7–11.

¹³ Cf. below, pp. 183 ff.

¹⁴ *Tabāfut al-Falāsifah* XVIII, 62, p. 328, ll. 13–14.

¹⁵ *Moreh* I, 51, p. 76, ll. 26–27.

¹⁶ *Tabāfut al-Tabāfut* III, 233, p. 258, ll. 10–11.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Fīṣal*, IV, p. 208, ll. 5–6.

tive description of universals has, as we shall see later,¹⁹ an affirmative meaning, namely, that of ascribing to universals intramental existence, in opposition both to those who ascribe to them extramental existence and to those who maintain that they are mere words.

In the second report, the account of the origin of the theory of *aḥwāl* is followed by a number of challenging questions put to Abū Hāshim by “our fellow orthodox.”²⁰ Each of the questions is answered by Abū Hāshim and each answer contains some additional information about the theory of modes. Thus in answer to one question, Abū Hāshim makes the statement that “neither does he say that the modes are existent nor does he say that they are nonexistent.”²¹ Then, in the course of this questioning by “our fellow orthodox,” Abū Hāshim seems to have begun to apply his theory of modes to the problem of divine attributes and to speak of “the *aḥwāl* of the Creator”²² and, in answer to a direct question with regard to the modes in their application to the Creator, he said that “they are neither He nor other than He.”²³ This, as we shall see later,²⁴ is an old formula, which had been used by the Attributists as a denial of the Christian belief that the second and third persons of the Trinity are each God but to which Abū Hāshim gave a new meaning as a denial of both the reality of attributes as conceived of by the Attributists and the verballity of attributes as conceived of by the Mu'tazilites. Undoubtedly in the course of his answers to the various challenging questions he also had occasion to say that the modes in their application to divine attributes, like the modes as a general theory of predication, are “neither existent nor nonexistent,” for elsewhere it is directly reported that “Abū Hāshim posited modes as attributes which are neither existent [nor nonexistent].”²⁵

Thus Abū Hāshim by his theory of modes has placed

¹⁹ Cf. below, p. 197.

²⁰ *Fark*, p. 181, l. 17.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 182, l. 5.

²² *Milal*, p. 56, l. 3.

²³ *Ibid.*, l. 9.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, l. 14.

²⁵ Cf. below, p. 211.

himself in opposition to the conception of attributes of both the Attributists and the Mu'tazilites. But here a question arises in our minds. Inasmuch as Abū Hāshim's theory of modes is a denial of the verballity of attributes as conceived of by the Mu'tazilites, it must follow that the differences between the various modes predicated of God are not mere nominal or verbal differences, and hence also the plurality of modes in God is not a mere nominal or verbal plurality. How then would Abū Hāshim have met the Mu'tazilite argument that, inasmuch as the unity of God includes internal unity in the sense of absolute simplicity, a plurality in God of modes like those conceived of by Abū Hāshim would be incompatible with the internal unity and simplicity of God? Now, as we have seen,²⁶ when the Attributists were confronted by the Mu'tazilites with this argument, they downrightly denied that the unity of God includes internal unity in the sense of absolute simplicity, maintaining that the unity of God, according to their own conception of it, does not exclude from Him a plurality of parts which from eternity have been united with each other and with the essence of God. The question, therefore, is how Abū Hāshim would have dealt with this argument. Would he have found himself compelled to resort, like the Attributists, to a denial of the absolute simplicity of God, or would he have discovered some other way of fending off that argument of the Mu'tazilites?

An answer to this question is to be found in a statement quoted repeatedly in the name of Abū Hāshim by Shahrastānī both in his *Milal* and in his *Nihāyat*. In his *Milal*, after stating that Abū Hāshim "posited modes as attributes which are neither existent [nor nonexistent] and neither cognizable nor incognizable,"²⁷ he adds: "Then Abū Hāshim posits of God another mode (*ḥālāh*) which necessarily causes (*aujabat*) these modes."²⁸ Almost in the same words he says in his *Nihāyat* that "Abū Hāshim posits another mode (*ḥālāh*)

²⁶ Cf. above, pp. 138-139.

²⁷ *Milal*, p. 56, ll. 3-4.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, l. 12.

which necessarily causes these modes."²⁹ In another place in his *Nihāyat*, he quotes Abū Hāshim as saying: "Knowingness is a mode and powerfulness is a mode, and benefiting both of them is a mode (*ḥāl*) which necessarily causes all the modes."³⁰ In still another place in the same work, he makes an opponent of modes say: "Did not Abū Hāshim posit of God a mode (*ḥāl*) which necessarily causes His being knowing and willing?"³¹ An allusion to the difference between the plurality of modes as applied to God and the plurality of modes as applied to other beings is also to be found, I believe, in a passage in which, after stating that the terms "existing," "living," and "knowing" predicated of God by a certain Nestorius are used by him in the sense of Abū Hāshim's modes, Shahrastānī adds the following: "His statement ultimately amounts to the assertion that God's being existing and living and [knowing used in the sense of] rational is as the philosophers say in the definition of man [that he is living and rational], except that in respect to man the things predicated of him differ, seeing that man is composite, whereas [in respect to God they do not differ], seeing that God is a simple substance, incomposite."³² The difference spoken of by him in that passage is undoubtedly due to what he says in his statements here that all the various modes predicated of God stem from one single mode.

Statements parallel to those of Shahrastānī are to be found in Rāzī. In one place, he attributes to Abū Hāshim the view that "knowingness, powerfulness, livingness, and existingness are caused by a fifth mode (*ḥālāh*), and this notwithstanding the fact that all the modes are eternal,"³³ the implication being that the four modes mentioned are eternally caused by the fifth mode. In another place, he says: "Abū Hāshim maintains that God's essence is like other essences in essentiality and that it differs from them only by a mode (*ḥālāh*) which necessarily causes four modes, namely, livingness, knowing-

²⁹ *Nihāyat*, p. 160, ll. 12-13.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 198, ll. 2-3.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 140, ll. 3-4.

³² *Milal*, p. 175, ll. 18-20.

³³ *Muḥaṣṣal*, p. 55, l. 17.

ness, existingness, and powerfulness.”³⁴ In none of these passages, it will be noticed, are we told what that underlying causative mode in God is. This information, however, is furnished by Tūsī in his comment on the second passage quoted from Rāzī. Using the term “attribute” for the term “mode” in Rāzī’s passage, he remarks: “The attribute which Abū Hāshim alone, and no other, ascribes to God is the attribute of Godhood (*al-ilābiyyah*).”³⁵ Described as “Godhood,” this single mode thus belongs to God alone and as such it is what Aristotle would call a “property” (*ἵδιον* = *ḥāṣṣiyyah*), which, as defined by him, means a term predicated of a thing and belonging “to that thing alone.”³⁶ In fact, as we shall see, Juwaynī describes that single mode of Abū Hāshim as being God’s “most proper” (*aḥaṣṣ*) description.³⁷

According to these statements, then, the theory of modes introduced two innovations.

First, it gave a new meaning to the old formula “neither God nor other than God” and it also framed the new formula “neither existent nor nonexistent,” using both of these formulae as a description of modes in their contrast to attributes as conceived by both the Attributists and the Mu’tazilites.

Second, it introduced the view that modes, the new name for attributes, are related to God as effects to their cause. That was something new, for to the Attributists there was no causal relationship between God and His attributes. From the earliest times the attributes are spoken of as being coeternal with God or as subsisting in His essence or as being super-added to His essence, without any suggestion that they were proceeding from Him as from a cause. Only with reference to the attribute of word or speech, in the sense of the eternal Koran, is God conceived of as the cause of that attribute. The absence of any conception of causal relationship between the essence of God and His attributes among the orthodox Attributists is clearly implied in Ibn Kullāb’s description of

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 111, ll. 13–14.

³⁶ *Topics* I, 5, 102a, 18–19; cf. *Philo*, II, p. 131.

³⁷ *Irshād*, p. 47, l. 4 (80).

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 111, n. 2, l. 2.

the divine attributes as being “ceaselessly uncreated,”³⁸ that is to say, eternally uncaused. It is more clearly brought out in Ghazālī who openly discusses the problem of the relation between the attributes of God and His essence. The view which he maintains in effect is that the essence is not in need of the attributes for its existence, whereas the attributes are in need of the essence for their existence, for as attributes they are in need of a subject (*mauṣūf*) in which to exist.³⁹ But the existence of attributes in a subject, he goes on to explain, does not establish between them a causal relationship in the true sense of the term, that is, in the sense of the relationship between an effect and its “efficient cause” (*‘illah fā‘iliyyah*), even though, he adds, philosophers in their artificial terminology call the subject of which an attribute is predicated a “receptive cause” (*‘illah ḡabliyyah*) and the attribute predicated of the subject a “caused thing” (*ma‘lūl*).⁴⁰

It is to be noted that, in the opposition aroused by the theory of *aḥwāl* among the Attributists, only the question of formula became a matter of discussion; the question of a causal relationship between God and His attributes is never discussed. This would seem to indicate that this difference, though it existed, was not considered as a matter of religious significance. In fact, about three centuries later, the Hanbalite Ibn Qudāma (d. 1223), without any trace of influence by Abū Hāshim’s modalism, out of his own orthodox faith says that “His attributes are from Him (*minhu*),”⁴¹ that is to say, they proceed from God as their cause.

The theory of modes which arose among the Mu’tazilites as a moderate form of their denial of attributes was, according to the testimony of Ibn Ḥazm,⁴² adopted by some Ash‘arites as a moderate form of their affirmation of attributes. Two of such Ash‘arites, Bākillānī and Juwaynī, are mentioned by Shahrastānī in his *Nihāyat*. Of Bākillānī he says that after some hesitation he accepted the theory of modes⁴³ and of

³⁸ *Fīṣal*, IV, p. 208, ll. 4–5.

³⁹ *Tabāfut al-Falāsifah* VI, 5, p. 166, ll. 2–4.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 8–9, p. 166, l. 12 – p. 167, l. 6.

⁴¹ *Tabrīm* 19, p. 12, l. 12.

⁴² Cf. below, pp. 215–216.

⁴³ *Nihāyat*, p. 131, ll. 5–6.

Juwaynī he says that at first he affirmed modes and later he denied them.⁴⁴ Rāzī similarly describes both Bākillānī and Juwaynī as those who adopted the theory of modes.⁴⁵

But, as we shall see, though both of them in adopting the theory of modes tried to harmonize it with their own belief in attributes, the manner of their harmonization was not the same.

The manner in which Bākillānī harmonized it with his belief in attributes may be gathered from a tripartite passage in Shahrastānī's *Milāl*. First, it reproduces from a work of Bākillānī Ash'arī's argument against the modalistic formula that the modes are neither existent nor nonexistent on the ground that it is in violation of the Law of Excluded Middle. Second, it refers to the fact that Bākillānī refuted that argument and established his own view of modes without actually giving up his belief in attributes as being real things (*ma'ānī*) in God. Third, it quotes Bākillānī as saying: "The mode posited by Abū Hāshim, when he posited a mode which necessarily causes those [modes which we call] attributes, is that which we call attribute in particular."⁴⁶

Thus whatever else his own formulated theory of modes may have contained, it was primarily based upon Abū Hāshim's conception of a single mode as the cause of all the other modes.

Juwaynī's harmonization of modes with attributes, unlike that of Bākillānī, is not based upon an acceptance of Abū Hāshim's view of a single mode as the cause of all other modes. That view is rejected by him as heretical. Thus in his *Irshād*, after stating that "the Mu'tazilites and the heretics who follow them agree upon the denial of attributes,"⁴⁷ he enumerates three such heretical groups, one of which, the second, is described by him as follows: "Others express themselves by saying that these predicative terms are affirmed of the essence of God on account of His having a mode (*ḥalah*) which is

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, ll. 8-9.

⁴⁵ *Muḥaṣṣal*, p. 38, ll. 19-20.

⁴⁶ *Milāl*, p. 67, ll. 2-8.

⁴⁷ *Irshād*, p. 46, l. 20 - p. 47, l. 1 (80).

the most proper (*aḥaṣṣ*) of His descriptions and this mode necessarily causes Him to be described as living, knowing, and powerful."⁴⁸ The view thus described is quite evidently that of Abū Hāshim.

The manner in which Juwaynī does harmonize modes with attributes may be gathered from a study of two chapters in his *Irshād*, of which one deals with divine attributes under the heading "Attributes Necessary of God"⁴⁹ and the other deals with modes as a general theory of predication under the heading "The Establishment of the Knowledge of Attributes."⁵⁰ Now the very phrasing of the headings of these two chapters would seem to indicate that terms predicated of God, which are referred to by Juwaynī as attributes, are regarded by him as modes in their use in the general theory of predication. But his treatment of attributes as modes emerges more clearly from a close comparison of his description and illustration of what he finds to be the two kinds of divine attributes with his description and illustration of what he finds to be the two kinds of modes. From such a comparison we learn that what with regard to divine attributes he calls *ṣifāt naḥsiyyah*⁵¹ — "attributes of the subject itself," such as "eternally pre-existent,"⁵² "one,"⁵³ and "eternally post-existent"⁵⁴ — corresponds to what with regard to the general theory of modes constitutes the first form of "uncaused modes," namely, properties.⁵⁵ Thus attributes of this kind are regarded by him as modes which are described by him as neither existent nor nonexistent.⁵⁶ Similarly what with regard to divine attributes he calls *ṣifāt ma'nawīyyah*⁵⁷ — such as "knowing," "powerful," "living,"⁵⁸ "willing,"⁵⁹ "hearing,"⁶⁰ "seeing,"⁶¹ and "speaking"⁶² — is with regard to the general theory of modes

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 47, ll. 3-5.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 17, l. 16 (38).

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 46, l. 18.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 17, l. 17.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 18, l. 19.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 30, l. 15 (57).

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 46, l. 9 (78).

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 47, ll. 13 and 16-18 (81); cf. below, p. 187.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, l. 12.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 17, l. 17.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 37, ll. 7-8 (66).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, l. 12.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 43, l. 1 (74).

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 45, l. 17 (78).

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 58, l. 4 (98).

called by him "caused modes,"⁶³ the cause of which he calls *ma'nā*,⁶⁴ from which we have reason to infer that by *ṣifāt ma'nawīyyah* he means *ma'nā*-caused attributes.⁶⁵ Accordingly, such attributes as knowing, powerful, living, willing, hearing, seeing, and speaking are modes which are neither existent nor nonexistent, but each of these modes is caused by a corresponding *ma'nā*, such as "knowledge, power, life, will, audition, sight, and speech," and each of these *ma'ānī* is a real attribute existing in God. This is how Juwaynī harmonized modes with attributes. Of course, it is to be understood that in the case of modes as a theory of divine attributes the causal relation between the *ma'nā* and its corresponding mode is an eternal relation, analogous to the eternal causal relationship implied in the concept of eternal generation as used in Christianity and in Plotinus.⁶⁶ It is Juwaynī's type of harmonization of modes with attributes that Rāzī quite evidently had in mind when, after referring "to those who support modes among the orthodox," he says, evidently with reference only to what Juwaynī calls *ṣifāt ma'nawīyyah*, that "they maintain that knowingness is an attribute caused by a *ma'nā* subsisting in God and this *ma'nā* is knowledge."^{66a}

A precise exposition of what quite obviously is Juwaynī's harmonization of modes with attributes is to be found in Faḍālī's discussion of the attributes powerful, willing, know-

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 47, l. 12.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, ll. 12 and 13-14.

⁶⁵ Here the term *ma'nawīyyah* quite evidently means "*ma'nā*-caused," referring as it does to such predicative modes as "knowing," "powerful," and the like, which have "knowledge," "power," and the like, each of which is a *ma'nā*, as their respective causes. It is in this sense of such predicative modes as "knowing" and "powerful" that the expression *ṣifāt ma'nawīyyah* is used in Faḍālī's *Kifāyat*, p. 57, l. 4, in contrast to the expression *ṣifāt al-ma'ānī*, which is used on p. 56, l. 39, in the sense of such substantive terms as "knowledge" and "power." However, in a passage to be quoted later from *Kashf*, p. 56, l. 4 (cf. below, p. 215 at n. 39), where Averroes uses the term *ma'nawīyyah* as a description of Ash'arī's belief in the reality of attributes, it is quite evidently used in the sense of "real," that is to say, as an adjective of *ma'nā*, where *ma'nā* is used in the sense of *shay*, "thing," of which it is used as an equivalent (cf. above, p. 115).

⁶⁶ Cf. below, p. 299.

^{66a} *Muḥaṣṣal*, p. 131, ll. 7-9.

ing, living, hearing, seeing, and speaking. His discussion may be restated as follows.

Whenever in the essence of a subject there is power (*ḡudrah*), the subject is said to be powerful (*ḡadir*). There is, however, a difference between the substantive term power and the predicative term powerful. Power is something actually existent [and is thus a real attribute (*ma'nā*)];^{66b} powerful is neither existent nor nonexistent and is thus a mode (*ḡāl*). There is also a difference between the interrelationship of these two terms in their application to created beings and their interrelationship in their application to God. In the case of their application to created beings, both the power in them and their being powerful are created, and the relation of power to powerful is that of cause (*'illah*); in the case of their application to God, wherein both the power in Him and His being powerful are eternal, "power is not said to be a cause in His being powerful; it is only said that between power and His being powerful there is a necessary interrelation (*talāzum*)."^{66c} What has thus been said about the predicative term powerful holds true also of the other six predicative terms mentioned above, all of which are modes.^{66d} Then, also, all these modes are to be described as *ṣifāt ma'nawīyyah*, attributes derived from their respectively corresponding substantive terms, which are *ṣifāt al-ma'ānī*, attributes in the sense of real things, and of which the relation to their respective modes is in the case of created beings that of cause and in the case of God that of a mere necessary interrelationship.^{66e}

The theory of modes is associated with the name of Abū Hāshim, and Shahrastānī in one of his works says explicitly that prior to Abū Hāshim ibn al-Jubbā'ī there is no mention of the theory of modes.⁶⁷ Still Shahrastānī himself in another work tries to show that Abū al-Hudhayl, who lived about a

^{66b} Cf. below at n. 66^e.

^{66c} *Kifāyat*, p. 55, ll. 7-26 and 26-30.

^{66d} *Ibid.*, p. 55, l. 37 - p. 56, l. 39.

^{66e} *Ibid.*, p. 56, l. 39 - p. 57, l. 8; cf. above, n. 65.

⁶⁷ *Nihāyat*, p. 131, ll. 3-5.

century before Abū Hāshim, held a view which is like the theory of modes of Abū Hāshim,⁶⁸ or, in other words, that Abū al-Hudhayl anticipated Abū Hāshim's theory of modes.

The original view of Abū al-Hudhayl is reported by Ash'arī as follows: "God is knowing by a knowledge which is He and He is powerful by a power which is He and He is living by a life which is He."⁶⁹ In Baghdādī only the second part of the formula is reproduced. It reads: "The knowledge of God is God and His power is He."⁷⁰ In Ibn Ḥazm the formula is paraphrased to read: "The knowledge of God is eternal and it is God."⁷¹ In Shahrastānī it reads: "The Creator is knowing by a knowledge which is himself (*nafsukū*)"⁷² or "the Creator is knowing by knowledge and His knowledge is His essence (*dhātukū*), powerful by power and His power is His essence, living by life and His life is His essence."⁷³

Upon this last formulation of Abū al-Hudhayl's theory of attributes, Shahrastānī makes the following comment: "The difference between the statement of him who says that God is knowing in virtue of His essence and not in virtue of knowledge and the statement of him who says [that is, Abū al-Hudhayl] that He is knowing in virtue of a knowledge which is His essence is that the former statement is a denial of attributes, whereas the latter statement is an affirmation either of essence as being itself attribute or of attribute as being itself essence. But if Abū al-Hudhayl takes these attributes to be aspects (*wujūh*) of the essence, then they are the same as the hypostases (*aḳānīm*) of the Christians or the modes (*aḥwāl*) of Abū Hāshim."⁷⁴

What he means to say is this. When the expression "knowing in virtue of His essence" is qualified by the expression "and not in virtue of knowledge," which is the formula used by Nazzām⁷⁵ but is ascribed by Shahrastānī himself to the

⁶⁸ *Milal*, p. 34, ll. 19-20.

⁶⁹ *Maḳālāt*, p. 165, ll. 5-6; cf. p. 188, ll. 11-13.

⁷⁰ *Fark*, p. 108, ll. 7-8.

⁷¹ *Fisal* II, p. 126, ll. 24-25.

⁷² *Nibāyat*, p. 180, l. 6.

⁷³ *Milal*, p. 34, ll. 13-14.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, ll. 17-20.

⁷⁵ *Maḳālāt*, p. 486, ll. 11-12.

Mu'tazilites in general,⁷⁶ it means that attributes are non-existent, that they are mere verbal utterances (*al-alfāz*) or what would be described in Latin as a mere emission of voice (*flatus vocis*), so that when they are predicated of God, each predicate of God is only a name of God. Not so, however, is the view of Abū al-Hudhayl. When he begins by saying that "God is knowing in virtue of knowledge" and then proceeds to qualify that statement by saying that "that knowledge is His essence" or that it is "himself," then what he says lends itself to two interpretations.

First, it may mean that knowledge is God himself — an interpretation which, as we shall see, is given to it by Ibn al-Rāwandī. But this interpretation, as we shall also see, is refuted by Ḥayyāt as well as by Shahrastānī himself.⁷⁷

Second, it may mean that "knowledge," or any other attribute, on the one hand, is other than the essence of God and, on the other, is the same as the essence of God; in other words, that, on the one hand, it is existent and, on the other, it is nonexistent, or that it is neither existent nor nonexistent, and hence neither other than God nor the same as God. But such an interpretation, Shahrastānī goes on to say, implies that knowledge and all the other terms predicated of God are considered by Abū al-Hudhayl as "aspects of the essence" and thus they are what Abū Hāshim later came to call "modes," for modes are described by the Modalists as "aspects."⁷⁸ His mention here of "the hypostases of the Christians" refers to those Christians whose formulation of the Trinity, as we shall see,⁷⁹ is compared by Shahrastānī to Abū Hāshim's formulation of modes and hence he infers that the hypostases would similarly be described by them as "aspects."

This is what one may get out of Baghdādī and Juwaynī and Shahrastānī as to the history and meaning of Abū Hāshim's theory of *Aḥwāl* in its bearing upon the problem of attributes. Essential points in its history are three. (1) It was started by

⁷⁶ *Milal*, p. 30, ll. 7-8.

⁷⁷ Cf. below, pp. 230-231.

⁷⁸ Cf. below, pp. 231-232.

⁷⁹ Cf. below, pp. 338-339.

Abū Hāshim, in his criticism of Mu'ammār's theory of *Ma'nā*, as a general theory of predication. (2) It was then applied by him to divine attributes as a sort of moderation of his fellow Mu'tazilites' thorough denial of attributes. (3) Subsequently it was adopted in some form or other by certain Attributists as a sort of moderation of their fellow Attributists' belief in the extreme reality of attributes.

Brief summaries of other explanations of Abū Hāshim's theory of modes are by the following: (1) A. Schmölders, who simply says: "Le mot *état* est la plus compliqué par l'étendue de sa signification. C'est pour me servir du langage d'Aristote, le *δυνάμει ὄν*, ou plutôt le terme générique de cette manière d'être" (cf. his *Essai* [1842], p. 197); (2) S. Horowitz, who takes it to be all based upon Plato's theory of ideas (cf. his *Kalam* [1909], pp. 54-69); (3) M. Horten, who, after several long studies on the subject ("Die Modus-Theorie des abū Hāschim," *ZDMG*, 63:303-324 [1909]; *Systeme* [1912], pp. 411-418; "Neues zur Modustheorie des abū Hāschim," *Festgabe zur 60. Geburtstag Clemens Baeumker* [1913], pp. 45-53), has arrived at the following conclusion: "Aus Gedanken, die der Inhärenzlehre der Vaiśeṣika nahestehen, sind die Theorien Mu'ammār und abū Hāšim entstanden" (*Die Philosophie des Islam* [1924], p. 185; cf. also, *Systeme*, p. 416, n. 2); (4) Simon van den Bergh, who takes the term *ḥāl* to be a translation of the Stoic *πὸς ἔχον* and theory based upon that term *ḥāl* to reflect the Stoic discussion of the *λεκτά* (Averroes' *Tabāfut al-Tabāfut* [1954], vol. II, p. 4);⁸⁰ (5) A. N. Nader, who, of the two types of modes in Shahrastānī's *Nihāyat* (cf. below, pp. 183ff.), says that they bring to mind "les jugements synthétiques dont parle Kant" and "les jugements analytiques dont parle Kant," and, with regard to the divine modes, says: "Pour mieux comprendre 'les modes' on peut les rapprocher des jugements analytiques chez Kant" (*Le Système Philosophique des Mu'tazila* [1956], pp. 211-212, and p. 212, n. 1).

⁸⁰ Cf. below, p. 202, n. 18a.

APPENDIX A. *The Threefold and the Twofold Classification of Modes*

From Baghdādī's two reports on Abū Hāshim quoted above we gather that the term *ḥāl*, conventionally translated by "mode," is used by Abū Hāshim as a designation of something existing in a person in virtue of which he differs from another person, which difference is expressed by a certain term predicated of him, so that that term predicated of him is called *ḥāl*. With this use of the term mode in mind, Abū Hāshim, as reported by Baghdādī, divides modes into three classes, of which each class is distinguished by the special manner in which the predicative term is predicated of its subject. In the first class, it is predicated of its subject "in virtue of the subject itself"; in the second class, it is predicated of its subject "in virtue of a *ma'nā*"; in the third class, it is predicated of its subject "neither in virtue of the subject itself nor in virtue of a *ma'nā*." What these three vague phrases mean is not explained in this threefold classification of modes as reported by Baghdādī, but an explanation of them is furnished in the twofold explanation of the same modes as reported by Juwaynī and Shahrastānī.

Both Juwaynī and Shahrastānī begin with a classification of modes into those which are "caused" and those which are "not caused."¹ Then Juwaynī goes on to say briefly that, "as for the mode which is caused, it includes every predicate (*ḥukm*) affirmed of the essence [of a subject] in virtue of a *ma'nā* subsisting in it, as, for instance, the affirmation that a living being is living and that a powerful being is powerful."² Of these two predicates mentioned by him, it is to be noted, "living," used, as we have explained above,³ in the sense of the duration of life, is an accident in living beings as is "powerful." In Shahrastānī, the corresponding explanation of caused modes reads as follows: "As for the first class of

¹ *Irshād*, p. 47, ll. 12-13 (81); *Nihāyat*, p. 132, ll. 2-3.

² *Irshād*, p. 47, ll. 13-14.

³ Cf. above, p. 153.

modes, it includes every predicate (*ḥukm*) [affirmed of a subject] in virtue of a cause subsisting in the essence [of a subject] which, according to Abū Hāshim, has life as a condition for its existence, as, for instance, the affirmation that a living being is living, knowing, powerful, willing, hearing, and seeing . . . so that life subsists in a subject and necessitates the subject to be living, and the same holds true of knowledge and power and will and of everything else of whose existence life is a condition. These predicates (*al-ahkām*) are called modes (*ahwāl*), that is, attributes (*ṣifāt*) superadded to the *ma'ānī* which necessitate them."⁴ According to the report in Shahrastānī, then, by the *ma'nā* is meant the substantive terms life, knowledge, power, will, audition, and sight from which the corresponding adjectival predicative modes living, knowing, willing, hearing, and seeing are derived.

Then both Juwaynī and Shahrastānī go on to say, the former that "according to our opinion" and the latter that "according to the opinion of the Ḳāḍī [Bāḳillānī]," the conception of caused modes should not be restricted to living beings or, as they express themselves, it should not be restricted to beings in the case of which the *ma'nā* in them has "life as a condition" for its existence. It should be extended to non-living beings, so that the terms "moving" and "black" predicated of an inanimate body are to be called modes, the causes of which are the *ma'ānī*,⁵ by which is meant "motion" and "blackness."

From all this we gather that the caused modes of Abū Hāshim as reported by Juwaynī and Shahrastānī consist of predicates, including among them the predicate "knowing," all of which are accidents in living beings and each of which is caused by a *ma'nā*. This quite evidently corresponds to Abū Hāshim's second class of modes as reported by Baghdādī in the second part of his first report, where they are said to

⁴ *Nihāyat*, p. 132, ll. 5-10.

⁵ *Irshād*, p. 47, ll. 14-16; *Nihāyat*, p. 132, ll. 10-13.

refer to a situation in which "a certain thing" is predicated of a subject "in virtue of a *ma'nā*," where the "certain thing" is, as in the first part of this same first report, the term "knowing" and the *ma'nā* is, as in Shahrastānī's classification of modes, the term "knowledge."

So much for Abū Hāshim's caused modes.

As for his uncaused modes, they are illustrated both in Juwaynī and in Shahrastānī by two kinds of predicates.

In Juwaynī, the first kind of predicate is illustrated by "the space-occupancy (*taḥayyuz*) of substance,"⁶ that is, by the predicate in the proposition "the atom is space-occupying." Now the space-occupancy of substance, that is, of the atom, is used by him earlier in the same work with reference to divine attributes as an illustration of what he calls "the attributes of the self (*ṣifāt nafsīyyah*)," that is to say, attributes of the subject itself, which is described by him as "every attribute affirmed of the subject itself, which belongs to the subject itself as long as the subject lasts and which is uncaused."^{6a} Since the term "self" in the expression "attribute of the self" here refers to God, the term "attribute" in it cannot be taken as genus or species; it must be taken as property, that is, as belonging to God alone. The expression "attribute of the self," therefore, quite evidently reflects Aristotle's description of property as "whatever belongs to each thing in virtue of itself (*καθ' αὐτό*) but is not in its essence (*οὐσία*),"⁷ in contrast to his use of the same phrase "in virtue of itself" in the sense of "whatever is present in what anything is (*ἐν τῷ τί ἐστίν*)," that is to say, whatever is part of a definition, such, for instance, as the term "animal" predicated of an individual human being, "for animal is present in the for-

⁶ *Irshād*, p. 47, l. 17.

^{6a} *Irshād*, p. 17, ll. 17-18 (38-39).

⁷ *Metaph.* V, 30, 1025a, 31-32. In the Arabic version of the *Metaphysics*, *καθ' αὐτό* is translated by *bi-dhātihī*, "in virtue of its essence," and *οὐσία* is translated by *fī al-jawhar*, "in the substance" (cf. *Averroes' Long Commentary on Metaphysics* V, Text. 35, p. 693, ll. 4-5). But *bi-dhātihī* and *bi-nafsihī* are used interchangeably (cf. below, pp. 225-226, and n. 9 below).

mula that defines him.”⁸ The use of the space-occupancy of the atom as an example of the Aristotelian conception of property as a predicative term is in accordance with a view current in the Kalam.⁹

The second form of predicates of uncaused modes in Juwaynī is illustrated by the proposition that “an existent thing (*al-maujūd*) is accident, color, blackness, a state of being (*kaun*), knowledge, et cetera.”¹⁰ Reflected in this proposition is his own statement earlier in the same work, that the world consists of substances (that is, atoms) and accidents and that “accident” includes “colors, tastes, odors, life, death, knowledges, wills, powers,” and also “states of being (*al-akwan*),” that is to say, “motion, rest, aggregation, and segregation.”¹¹ As Juwaynī undoubtedly was already acquainted with the terms genus, species, specific difference, and subaltern genera and species used in philosophy in connection with its classification of things, we may assume that by the term “accident” in his classification of accidents he meant genus, that by the plural “colors” he meant “blackness” and “whiteness” and the other colors, which he regarded as subaltern species under the species “color,” that by the plural “states of being” he meant that each of the four states of being mentioned by him is a subaltern species under the species “state of being,” and so also with the other plural terms mentioned by him in his classification of accidents. Accordingly, in the proposition quoted above, in which the predicative terms “accident” and “color” and “blackness” and “state of being” and “knowledge” are used by him as illustrations of the second form of his uncaused modes, by “accident” he means genus, by “color” and “state of being” and “knowledge” he means species, and

⁸ *Ibid.* V, 18, 1022a, 27–29.

⁹ The expression commonly used as a description of the space-occupancy of the atom is *ṣif al-dhātīyyah*, but this expression is used in the sense of Aristotle’s *καθ’ αὐτό* as a description of property and as the equivalent of *li-nafsihi* (cf. Biram’s n. 3 on pp. 18–19 of the German part of his edition of Abū Rashīd’s *Masā’il*).

¹⁰ *Irshād*, p. 47, ll. 19–20 (81).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10, ll. 7–10 (28).

by “blackness” he means subaltern species under the species “color.”¹²

Thus by the first form of his uncaused modes Juwaynī means properties and by the second form he means genera and species.

So also in Shahrastānī, the first form of uncaused modes is illustrated by the example of “the space-occupancy of the atom”¹³ and is explained by the statement that “any existent thing which has a property (*ḥāṣṣiyyah*) by which it is distinguished from another thing is distinguished from that other thing by a property which is only a mode.”¹⁴ Similarly the second form of uncaused modes is illustrated by the proposition that “an existent thing [*al-maujūd*] is accident and color and blackness”¹⁵ and is explained by the statement that “so also that by which like things are alike and different things are different is a mode, and such modes are what we call attributes pertaining to genera and species.”¹⁶

The two forms of Juwaynī’s and Shahrastānī’s uncaused modes, we shall now try to show, correspond respectively to Baghdādī’s first and third classes of modes.¹⁷

As for the first form, namely, properties, it corresponds to Baghdādī’s description of his first class of modes as referring to predicates affirmed of a subject “in virtue of itself (*li-nafsihi*).” The phrase “in virtue of itself,” as we have seen, reflects a phrase used by Aristotle as a description of property.

As for the second form of uncaused modes, namely, genera and species, it corresponds to Baghdādī’s third class of modes, which, in contrast to the first class (namely, properties) and the second class (namely, accidents), is said by him to be that in which a subject described by a certain predicate

¹² Cf. Porphyry, *Isagoge*, p. 1, l. 17 – p. 13, l. 8.

¹³ *Nihāyat*, p. 132, l. 19.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 133, ll. 1–2.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 132, l. 19 – p. 133, l. 1. The bracketed term *al-maujūd* is an emendation of the term *al-‘araḍ*, “accident,” of the printed text and the underlying manuscripts. I have made this emendation on the basis of the corresponding passage in Juwaynī quoted above at n. 10.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, ll. 2–3.

¹⁷ See quotation of Baghdādī’s text above, pp. 169–170.

"possesses that predicate rather than some other predicate in virtue of a *ḥāl*." This is a fitting description of predicative terms which are genera and species in contrast to those which are properties and accidents, for, while a subject can be said to have many different properties and many different accidents, no subject can be said to belong to more than one genus and to more than one species, for subaltern species are, according to Aristotle, one and the same species,¹⁸ and this is true also of subaltern genera. It is to be noted how in his description of the function of *ḥāl* in the first two classes of modes, Baghdādī carefully says that, in the case of the first class, it is simply to explain why the subject deserves its predicate and similarly, in the case of the second class, it is simply to explain why the subject came to possess the *ma'nā* in virtue of which it is described by a certain predicate. In neither of these cases does he say, as he does in the case of the third class, that it is that predicate rather than some other predicate that the subject deserves or is described by.

And so the threefold classification of modes in Baghdādī are reducible to the twofold classification of modes in Juwaynī and Shahrastānī. Baghdādī's first and third classes mean the same as what they call uncaused modes, and these include predicates which are either properties (Baghdādī's first type) or predicates which are genera or species (Baghdādī's third type). Baghdādī's second class of mode means the same as what in the twofold classifications is described as caused modes, and these include predicates which are accidents. All these types of modes thus correspond to four of Porphyry's five predicables.

APPENDIX B. *Relation of Abū Hāshim's Theory of Ahwāl to Mu'ammār's Theory of Ma'nā*

In the first of Baghdādī's two reports, which we have analyzed above, one could not have failed to notice a discon-

¹⁸ *Metaph.* V, 10, 1018a, 1 and 7-8.

gruity between its two parts, and this despite the fact that the second part is introduced as a consequence following from the first. In the first part, Abū Hāshim is reported to have rejected Mu'ammār's *ma'nā*, substituting for it the *ḥāl*; in the second part, he is reported to have retained Mu'ammār's *ma'nā* in the second of his three classes of modes, using the *ḥāl* only as supplementary to it. The non sequitur of the second part from the first is quite evident. The explanation that suggests itself to me is that in the source of Baghdādī's first report, its first part, like the first part in his second report, was followed by a series of questions and answers, and it was from Abū Hāshim's answers to questions that the second part followed as a consequence. The incongruity that now appears between the two parts of Baghdādī's first report is thus due to the omission of the intervening questions and answers that must have existed in the source of that report.

I shall not attempt to task the reader with having to wade through the boresome questions and answers which I have reconstructed in order to satisfy myself that the threefold classification of modes in the second part of the first report could have logically followed from them. What alone is really necessary for the purpose at hand is to show how the threefold classification of modes as reported in the second part, granted to have immediately arisen from an assumed missing series of questions and answers, has ultimately grown out of Abū Hāshim's criticism of Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā* as reported in the first part. This is what we shall now try to show.

In his theory of *ma'nā*, as we have seen, Mu'ammār deals only with accidents, for which he uses the example of motion. With regard to accidents, he raises two questions, in answer to each of which questions he makes use of the *ma'nā*, but the use he makes of the *ma'nā* differs in each of these answers. The first question raised is why accidents come into existence in a subject after their not having existed in it, to which his answer is that they come into existence by a *ma'nā*. The

ma'nā thus serves as the cause of the coming into existence of accidents in a subject of which they are used as predicates. The second question raised is why of two subjects, each of them possessing a *ma'nā*, only one of them is moved by its *ma'nā* at a certain particular time, whereas the other is moved by its *ma'nā* at some other time, to which his answer is that this is due to an infinite series of *ma'ānī*. The infinite series of *ma'ānī* thus serves as the cause of the difference between two subjects with reference to predicates which are accidents. Now Abū Hāshim admits with Mu'ammār that the coming into existence of accidents as predicates of a subject, for which he uses as an example the predicate "knowing," is due to a *ma'nā*. He rejects, however, Mu'ammār's explanation of the difference between subjects with reference to predicates which are accidents as being due to an infinite series of *ma'ānī*. To him it is due to *ḥāl*. This adoption of Mu'ammār's single *ma'nā* and rejection of his infinite series of *ma'ānī* by substituting for it *ḥāl* has resulted in Abū Hāshim's second and third classes of modes, which in some respect may be regarded as being only modified forms of Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā*.

Now predicates which are properties or genera and species, unlike predicates which are accidents, are coexistent with their subjects, and hence are not in need of a *ma'nā* to bring about their existence in their subjects. But still, in the case of property, there is need of an explanation why subjects differ with respect to properties. The answer given by Abū Hāshim is the same as the answer given by him to the question why subjects differ with respect to accidents, namely, that it is due to a *ḥāl*. This constitutes his first class of modes. In the case of genus and species, however, the question is, as we have seen, why a subject is described by one genus or species as its predicate rather than by another genus or species. The answer given by him, again, is that it is due to a *ḥāl*. This constitutes his third class of attributes.

This is how Abū Hāshim's threefold classification of modes has grown out of his criticism of Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā*.

But here a question rises in our mind. Mu'ammār's theory of *ma'nā*, as we have tried to show, originated as a result of his view that bodies have a nature which produces their accidents. This conception of a nature means, as we shall see later,¹ a belief in causality, in opposition to those in the Kalam who denied causality. Now Abū Hāshim, for all we know, like almost all the Mu'tazilites, except Mu'ammār and Naẓẓām, did deny causality. What need, therefore, was there for him to assume a *ma'nā* plus a *ḥāl* to explain why subjects have accidents as predicates and to assume a *ḥāl* to explain why subjects have genera and species and specific differences and properties as predicates? Why did not he simply say that they are directly created by God in their subjects?

In answer to this question, the following three things are to be noted with regard to the denial of causality in the Kalam: (1) that the denial of causality does not mean an unawareness of the commonly observed fact that events in the world directly created by God follow a certain order of succession; (2) that this commonly observed order of succession is explained by a theory of "custom" which is attributed either to the Ash'arites in general or to Ash'arī himself; (3) that, while Ghazālī, in accordance with his denial of causality, insists that, in that commonly observed order of succession of events, every preceding event is not the "cause" of the event following it but only a "condition" thereof, he himself is sometimes found to be using the term "cause" as descriptive of the relation between two successive events, which quite evidently means that in those instances he uses the term "cause" rather loosely.² It is in the light of this conception of the denial of causality that we are to understand Abū Hāshim's use of his *ma'nā* and *ḥāl*. In the order of succession in which, according to him, it is the custom of God to create events in the world, he maintains that a *ma'nā* plus a *ḥāl* or only a *ḥāl* is created by God prior to His creation of certain predicates in subjects; and, while he is using ex-

¹ Cf. below, pp. 559 ff.

² Cf. below, pp. 544-551.

pressions which imply that the *ma'nā* and *ḥāl* are causes, such as the expression "caused modes" and the expressions "in virtue of a *ma'nā*" and "in virtue of a *ḥāl*," the "cause" implied in the use of such expressions should be taken as a cause used in a loose sense. That the coinage of the term "custom" is ascribed to Ash'arites does not mean that Ash'ari's stepbrother and fellow-student, Abū Hāshim, and even others before him, did not have the idea of custom in their minds, even if there is no record of their having used the term custom. Similarly there is nothing against the assumption that the term "cause" was used by Abū Hāshim, and even by others before him, in a loose sense, even as it was so used later by Ghazālī. In fact, in Greek philosophy, the Epicureans, despite their denial of causality, sometimes use the term cause in a loose sense.³

So interpreted, the term *ma'nā*, as used by Abū Hāshim in his "caused modes" as reported by Juwaynī and Shahrastānī, and in his second class of modes as reported by Baghdādī, though borrowed from Mu'ammār, is not used by him in the same way that it is used by Mu'ammār. As used by Mu'ammār, each *ma'nā* is implanted by God in each body at the time of the creation of that body and the *ma'nā* acts by its own power as the cause of some appropriate accident in that body.⁴ As used by Abū Hāshim, each *ma'nā* is created by God in each body in connection with His creation of some accident in that body. But it is to be assumed that, once the accident and the *ma'nā* and also the *ḥāl* connected with it are created, all of them, the accident and the *ma'nā* and the *ḥāl*, have duration and need not be continuously created, for, as we shall see, the masters of the School of Baṣra, among whom Abū Hāshim is to be included, as well as Abū Hāshim's father, Jubbā'ī, held that creation involves duration.⁵ Similarly in the case of the application of *ḥāl* to properties and to genera and species, all

³ Such as the expressions *causa salutis* (Lucretius, *De Rer. Nat.* III, 348) and *morbi causa* (*ibid.*, 502).

⁴ Cf. below, pp. 565 and 572 ff.

⁵ Cf. below, pp. 533 and 537.

of which are created simultaneously with the creation of their subjects, it is to be assumed that, once a subject and the *ḥāl* connected with it are created, both the subject and the *ḥāl* have duration.

APPENDIX C. *The Term Ḥāl*

The question of the origin of the term *ḥāl* was raised by Ibn Ḥazm who, in his criticism of the theory of modes, says: "Before everything and after everything, one may ask them: Where did you get the term *aḥwāl*?"¹ In attempting to answer this question, let us see what are some of the special features which characterize Abū Hāshim's use of the term *ḥāl*.

From the reports of Baghdādī we gather that the term *ḥāl* was introduced by Abū Hāshim in connection with a proposition in which the predicate is the term "knowing," for which the examples used by him are "he who is knowing"; "Zayd is knowing."² From Baghdādī's first report we further gather that the term "knowing" is predicated of him who is knowing "in virtue of a *ḥāl* in which he is (*li-ḥāl kāna 'alay-hā*)," ³ which phrase calls for an explanation. Then, from a comparison of Abū Hāshim's second class of mode in the second part of Baghdādī's first report with the caused modes in Juwaynī's and Shahrastānī's reports, we gather that in a proposition like "Zayd is knowing" the term *ḥāl* would be applied by Abū Hāshim to the predicate "knowing" in virtue of a *ma'nā*, by which he meant "knowledge," and the subject Zayd would, according to him, come to possess that *ma'nā* of knowledge "in virtue of a *ḥāl* [in which he is]." ⁴ The question before us, therefore, is whether we can find in Greek philosophy a term the application of which to the term "knowing" predicated of a subject will explain the meaning of Abū Hāshim's phrase "in virtue of a *ḥāl* in which he is."

¹ *Fīṣal* V, p. 51, ll. 23–24.

² Cf. above, p. 168 at nn. 6 and 7.

³ *Ibid.*, n. 10.

⁴ Cf. above, Appendix A.

The most obvious candidate for such a term would be the Greek term *διάθεσις*, "disposition," which by the time of Abū Hāshim had already been translated, in the Arabic versions of Aristotle, by the term *ḥāl*, in contrast to the term *malakah*, which was used as a translation of the Greek *ἕξις*, "habit" or "state." Let us then see how the term *diathesis*, "disposition," is used by Aristotle.

In his *Categories*, Aristotle says that habit and disposition apply to a certain kind of quality,⁵ which means that they apply to a certain kind of accident. Since quality is defined by him as "that in virtue of which people are said to be such and such,"⁶ habit and disposition apply not only to a substantive term which designates a quality possessed by a subject but also to an adjectival term which is derived from that substantive term and is predicated of the subject which possesses the quality. Among the examples of a quality described as a habit he mentions "knowledge"⁷ and among the examples of a quality described as a disposition he mentions "heat,"⁸ so that not only "knowledge" but also "knowing" would be a habit and not only "heat" but also "hot" would be a disposition.⁹ "Habit differs from disposition," he says, "in that it is more lasting and stable."¹⁰ Still, he subsequently adds, "habits are also dispositions," for "those who have habits are disposed (*διάκεινται*) in some manner or other in virtue of them,"¹¹ which statement, in the Arabic translation of the *Categories*, reads that "he who has a habit is in virtue of that also in a certain *ḥāl* (*man kamat la-hu malakah fa-hurwa bi-hā bi-ḥāl mā aydan min al-aḥwal*)."¹² Accordingly, knowledge, which in the statement quoted above, is used by Aristotle as

⁵ *Categ.*, 8, 8b, 26-27.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁹ See also *ibid.*, 8b, 39, where the term "disposition" is applied to the term *θερμός*, "hot."

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 8b, 27-28.

¹² It may be added that *ibid.*, 9a, 7-8, for the Greek "they are disposed (*διάκεινται*) in some manner" the Arabic has "to him there is a certain *ḥāl*" and *ibid.*, 8b, 37-38, for the Greek "a man is disposed (*διάκεινται*)" the Arabic has "a man receives a *ḥāl*."

⁷ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 36.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 9a, 10 and 11-12.

an example of habit, is in other places described by him either both as a habit and as a disposition or only as a disposition. To quote: (1) "Knowledge is called knowledge of the object of knowledge, but it is called a habit and a disposition not of the object of knowledge but of the soul";¹³ (2) "Every disposition . . . is formed naturally in that of which it is a disposition . . . as knowledge is formed in the soul, being a disposition of the soul";¹⁴ "Disposition is the genus of knowledge";¹⁵ "Both knowledge itself and its genera, as disposition and habit, are predicated of a certain thing."¹⁶

Thus, according to Aristotle, the term disposition is applied to the predicate knowing because he who is knowing is disposed to knowledge. Adopting this Aristotelian application of the term disposition — for which the Arabic term is *ḥāl* — to the predicate knowing, Abū Hāshim makes use of it for his own purpose in two ways.

First, directly in opposition to Mu'ammar's view that the reason why the term knowing is predicated of A rather than of B is that in A there is an infinite series of *mā'ānī*, he maintains that the term knowing is predicated of A rather than of B "only in virtue of a *ḥāl* in which he is,"¹⁷ which, as we have seen, is the Arabic way of saying that it is only in virtue of his being disposed to knowledge, for, according to Aristotle, he who has the habit of knowledge, that is, he who is knowing, is thereby disposed to knowledge. This, as we have seen, is what he describes as the second class of modes, namely, accidents.

Second, extending the use of the term *ḥāl*, he applies it to two other types of predicates, namely, (1) properties and (2) genera and species, both of which types are, like the habit knowledge, stable and lasting, but, unlike knowledge, require no *mā'ānī* for their coming into existence. These, as we have

¹³ *Top.* IV, 4, 124b, 33-34.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* VI, 6, 145a, 34-37.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* II, 4, 111a, 23.

¹⁷ Cf. above, p. 169.

seen, are what he describes respectively as the first and third classes of modes.

The term *ḥāl* is thus used by Abū Hāshim neither simply in the sense of disposition nor simply in the sense of habit or state. It is, therefore, to be translated by the term mode, whose literal meaning "a manner" of existence would be taken to mean a state of existence containing a disposition for that state of existence.

Since the term *ḥāl* was originally applied by Abū Hāshim to predicates which are accidents and since also the term *ḥāl* was originally used by him in the technical sense of disposition, which Aristotle describes as a kind of quality and hence as an accident,¹⁸ it was quite natural for Abū Hāshim to describe *aḥwāl* as not being "things" (*ashyāʾ*)¹⁹ and as being "neither existent nor nonexistent,"²⁰ so as to contrast them with Muʿammar's *maʿānī* which are described as "existent things" (*ashyāʾ maujūdah*).²¹ That Abū Hāshim should, on account of their being accidents, describe *aḥwāl* as not being "things" and as being "neither existent nor nonexistent" may be explained on the ground of such Aristotelian statements about accident as that it "is only as it were a mere name,"²² that it is "closely akin to the nonexistent,"²³ and that it "may not exist."²⁴ Without being conscious of any difficulty, Abū Hāshim retained the same negative description of *ḥāl* when he applied that term to predicates which are properties, for, whatever differences there may be between accident and property, he knew that, as far as their existence was concerned, both property and inseparable accident have in common, as stated by Porphyry, "not to subsist without those things in which they are beheld."²⁵ But when he came to describe *ḥāl* in its application to genera and species, that is,

¹⁸ Cf. above, Appendix B and Appendix C.

¹⁹ *Farq*, p. 182, ll. 2-3; *Nihāyat*, p. 133, l. 4.

²⁰ *Farq*, p. 182, l. 5; *Nihāyat*, p. 133, l. 4; p. 198, ll. 4-5.

²¹ Cf. above, p. 155.

²² *Metaph.* VI, 2, 1026b, 13-14.

²³ *Ibid.*, 22.

²⁴ *Phys.* VIII, 5, 256b, 10.

²⁵ *Isagoge*, p. 21, ll. 9-10.

universals, as being neither existent nor nonexistent, he was confronted with Porphyry's enumeration of the various views about their existence, of which one view maintained that they have substantive existence apart from objects of sense and another view maintained that they reside merely in naked mental conceptions,²⁶ which was taken by some opponent of Abū Hāshim to mean that they are mere words. As against both these views Abū Hāshim argued that his negative description of genera and species really has a positive meaning, for it means that they have a special kind of existence, an intramental existence, which is unlike both the nonexistence of mere words and the extramental existence of objects of sense.²⁷

3. OPPOSITION TO ABŪ HĀSHIM

Abū Hāshim, who formally advanced a theory of modes, was a Muʿtazilite. The theory itself, however, was a veering away from the extreme nominalist position on attributes of the Muʿtazilites toward orthodoxy, but never reaching the extreme realist position of orthodoxy. The fate of any intermediate position has consequently overtaken it. It was disowned by both the Muʿtazilites and the orthodox. According to Baghdādī, it "was considered heretic by Abū Hāshim's fellow Muʿtazilites as well as by the other sects."¹ It has thus become the target of attack from both sides. But, as we have seen, there is a theory of modes as a mere theory of universals and there is a theory of modes as a theory of divine predicates, and of the latter, as we have also seen,² there are two versions: (1) the commonly accepted version, which was in opposition to both the orthodox Attributists and the Muʿtazilite Antiattributists; (2) the version by which Bākillānī and Juwaynī tried to harmonize modes with the orthodox belief in attributes, but which was rejected by Rāzī. The recorded criticisms of the theory of modes which we shall

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1, ll. 9-11.

²⁷ Cf. below, pp. 201-202.

¹ *Farq*, p. 180, ll. 17-18.

² Cf. above, pp. 171 and 175.

deal with here are aimed at it either as a theory of universals in general or as a theory of divine predicates according to its commonly accepted version.

The spokesman for the Mu'tazilites who opposed Abū Hāshim's theory of modes is Abū Hāshim's own father, Jubbā'ī. Three main arguments against modes are reported in the name of Jubbā'ī and others.

First, the theory of modes involves the same difficulty of an infinite regress as the theory of Mu'ammār. For, with regard to any subject but God, Abū Hāshim assumes that the modes are many in number. Since they are many in number, they must have something which they share in common and something by which they differ. But that difference between the modes will have to be explained by another mode; that other mode will introduce new differences, and these new differences will have to be explained by still another mode, and so it will go on to infinity.³

Second, the modes cannot be, as claimed by Abū Hāshim, neither existent nor nonexistent; they cannot but be nonexistent. This argument⁴ may be restated as follows. Since Abū Hāshim has rejected the orthodox view that predicates of God are *ma'ānī* or *ṣifāt*, that is, real things or attributes, and substituted for them modes, his modes must inevitably be either of the following two: either (a) they are mere words (*al-alfāz*), which, as common terms, are each predicable of many things because of their being rooted in one primary meaning of a word (*aṣl*), which is shared in common by all the different subjects of which the mode is predicated;⁵ or (b) they are intellectual aspects (*wujūh*) and considerations (*ʿtibārāt*), that is to say, they are the concepts formed in our mind (*al-maʿfihūmah*) when we judge things as being alike by participation (*al-ishṭirāk*) or as being unlike by separation (*al-iftirāk*).⁶ "But these aspects," he adds, "are like relation-

³ *Milal*, p. 56, ll. 14-16; cf. *Nihāyat*, p. 133, ll. 17-19.

⁴ *Milal*, p. 56, l. 16-p. 57, l. 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, ll. 16-17.

⁶ *Ibid.*, ll. 18-19.

ship (*al-nasab*), correlationships (*al-idāfāt*), proximity (*al-ḵurb*), remoteness (*al-bu'd*), and the like, which, according to the consensus of opinion, are not to be counted among real attributes"⁷ — a statement which would seem to show that the early Mu'tazilite Antiattributists, like the later Alfarabi and Avicenna, agreed that there is no implication of a belief in attributes by interpreting terms predicated of God as relations.⁸ Elsewhere, this second alternative is put as a separate argument addressed to the Modalists by their opponents, and it reads as follows: "What do you mean by saying that separation (*al-iftirāk*) and participation (*al-ishṭirāk*) are an intellectual judgment? If you mean by it that a thing may be known from one aspect and unknown from another aspect, then [they are intellectual aspects, and] intellectual aspects (*al-wujūh al-ʿakliyyah*) are mental and estimative considerations (*ʿtibārāt dhibniyyah wa-taḵḍiriyyah*), but these do not require to be taken as attributes firmly and they are like relationships and correlationships, such as proximity and remoteness between substances."⁹ The argument, in other words, is this: Since modes are not "real things called attributes," they must be either mere "words" or "intellectual aspects and considerations," but, even if they are "intellectual aspects and considerations," they are nonexistent, in the same way that "relations" are nonexistent.

Third, the theory of modes is contrary to the Law of Excluded Middle. To quote: "According to the opinion of those who maintain the theory of modes, it is a mode which cannot be described either by existence or by nonexistence, but this, as you see, is a contradiction (*tanāḳuḍ*) and an absurdity."¹⁰ The contradiction and absurdity we are expected

⁷ *Ibid.*, l. 19 - p. 57, l. 1.

⁸ Cf. Alfarabi, *Siyāsat*, p. 19, l. 15 - p. 20, l. 8; Avicenna, *Najāt*, p. 410, ll. 3-6 and 12-17 (see pp. 552-554 of my paper "Avicenna, Algazali, and Averroes on Divine Attributes," *Homenaje Millás Vallicrosa*, II [1956], 545-571).

⁹ *Nihāyat*, p. 135, ll. 2-5.

¹⁰ *Milal*, p. 57, ll. 5-6; cf. *Fark*, p. 182, ll. 1-7.

to see here is that according to the Law of Excluded Middle, already enunciated by Aristotle, "there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate."¹¹ In his *Nihāyat*, Shahrastānī restates this argument more fully as follows: "We know intuitively (*bi'l-badīhah*) that there is no intermediate between negation and affirmation and between nonexistence and existence, yet you believe that the mode is neither existent nor nonexistent, which is contrary (*mutanākiḍ*) to what is known by intuition."¹²

In consequence of this criticism of modes, Jubbā'ī and others reaffirmed the old Mu'tazilite conception of attributes, restating it as a theory of universals and predicables. As reported by Shahrastānī in the *Milal*, "they take participation (*al-ishtirāk*) and separation (*al-iftirāk*) to refer to words (*al-alfāẓ*) and names of genera (*asmā' al-ajnās*)."¹³ What they mean to say is that universal terms by which things are described as being similar or different are mere "words and generic names." The "intellectual aspects and considerations" which Abū Hāshim regards as a special kind of existence, a conceptual existence, an existence which is only in the mind, is an empty phrase. Things either have extramental existence or have no extramental existence. Mental or conceptual existence means a mere verbal existence, a mere emission of sound (*flatus vocis*), as the Scholastics would describe it. Thus the attributes, when called modes, would have to be described as nonexistent.

A similar rejection, by the opponents of modes, of conceptual existence and its reduction to a mere nominal existence is to be found also in the following statement in Shahrastānī's *Nihāyat*: "Those [among the Mu'tazilites] who deny modes are of the opinion that things are different or similar by their individual essences. As for names of genera and species, the generality of the former refers only to words by which similar

¹¹ *Metaph.* IV, 7, 1011b, 23-24.

¹³ *Milal*, p. 56, ll. 13-14.

¹² *Nihāyat*, p. 134, ll. 12-14.

things are designated, and so also is the peculiarity of the latter. Sometimes indeed a thing is known from one aspect and unknown from another aspect, but these aspects are considerations which do not refer to attributes surnamed modes peculiarly belonging to essences."¹⁴ What all this amounts to is a rejection of the modalistic conception of universals.

The three arguments against modes which we have quoted above did not remain unanswered by the Modalists.

The first argument, namely, that the theory of modes would have to lead to an infinite regress,¹⁵ is answered as follows: "Generality and peculiarity in mode is like genericity and specificity in genera and species. Genericity in genera is not a genus, so that every genus would demand a genus, which would lead to an infinite regress, and similarly specificity in species is not a species, so that every species would demand a species. By the same token, we conclude, the modality of modes does not demand a mode, so that it would lead to an infinite regress."¹⁶

The answer may be spelled out as follows: Modes are universals, such as genera and species, and should be treated like genera and species. Now, if you take the Tree of Porphyry and turn it upside down, beginning with individuals and tracing backward the succession of species and genera, then no matter how long a series of intermediate subaltern species and genera you may get, it will not be infinite, for you are ultimately bound to reach a *summum genus*.

The second argument, namely, that "intellectual judgments" are only "intellectual aspects," which in turn are only "mental and estimative considerations" like relations, such as "proximity and remoteness between substances,"¹⁷ is answered as follows: "These aspects are not abstract words subsisting in him who speaks but rather cognizable and intelligible relations, which, while they do not exist independently nor are known separately, are attributes by which essences are

¹⁴ *Nihāyat*, p. 133, ll. 6-10.

¹⁵ Cf. above, p. 198.

¹⁶ *Nihāyat*, p. 141, l. 16-p. 142, l. 1.

¹⁷ Cf. above, pp. 198-199.

described. Accordingly, what you call aspects, we call modes, for these cognizable realities are distinct from each other, even though the essence is the same, and the distinction between them points to the numerical difference of the two aspects or modes, being as they are, two real cognizables to which two distinct cognitions attach, one necessary, the other derived. Modes are thus unlike relations and correlations, for the latter refer to abstract words, in which there is no real knowledge attaching to a real cognizable."¹⁸

The Modalists are thus willing to describe the modes as "intellectual aspects and considerations" but, unlike the Nominalists, who use this expression as a designation of mere "words," the Modalists use it as a designation of a special kind of existence, an intramental existence, which is distinct from both mere "words" and extramental reality.^{18a}

But while the Modalists were not opposed to the use of the term "aspects," provided it is properly understood, the term in its general use was taken to have a nominalistic meaning. Thus Shahrastānī, who in one of his works, as we have just seen, uses the *wujūh*, "aspects," as a description of Abū al-Hudhayl's theory of modes,¹⁹ in another of his works uses it as a description of the nominalistic theory of attributes as opposed to the modes of Abū Hāshim. He thus says: "The Mu'tazilites held different opinions as to whether terms predicated of the [divine] essence are (1) modes (*alḥwāl*) of the essence or (2) aspects (*wujūh*) and considerations (*ʿtibārāt*). Most of them said that they are [aspects and considerations, that is,] names and judgments formed regarding the essence

¹⁸ *Nihāyat*, p. 137, l. 14-p. 138, l. 3.

^{18a} The discussion about the existence of *ḥāl* is similar, as has been suggested by van den Bergh (see above, p. 182), to the Stoic discussion about the existence of *λεκτόν*, "verbal expression." But the two are not the same. The Stoic discussion about the "verbal expression" gave rise to the formula that "the verbal expression is midway between a thought and a thing" (Arnim, *Fragmenta* II, p. 48, ll. 34-35), whereas the discussion here about the *ḥāl* has led to the conclusion that it is neither a word nor a thing but a thought.

¹⁹ Cf. above, p. 180, at n. 74.

... Abū Hāshim said: They are modes firmly and permanently attached to the essence."²⁰

The third argument, namely, that the description of modes as neither existent nor nonexistent and as neither knowable nor unknowable violates the Law of Excluded Middle,²¹ is answered as follows: "Arguments by logical division compelled us to establish the existence of modes, but necessity bid us not say that they are existent by themselves and knowable by themselves. For a thing is sometimes knowable along with something else and is not knowable by itself, as is the junction between substances and the contact and proximity and remoteness between them, for no junction and no contact can be known in a substance as long as no other substance gets joined to it. And if this obtains in the case of the kind of attributes which are essences and conceivable accidents, how much more so must it obtain in the case of attributes which are not essences but predications concerning essences?"²²

What this passage means may be restated as follows: Inasmuch as the Modalists assume that modes have a conceptual existence and inasmuch as they also assume that a conceptual existence is distinct both from the existence of real extramental things and from the nonexistence of mere uttered words, what they mean then by their formula that "modes are neither existent nor nonexistent" is that they are neither existent like real things nor nonexistent like mere words. So understood, their formula does not violate the Law of Excluded Middle, for the Law, as phrased by Aristotle, reads as follows: "There cannot be an intermediate between contradictories (*ἀντιφάσεις*), but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate."²³ The meaning of this is that only in the case of "contradictories" — that is, in the case of the affirmation and negation of the same predicate of the same subject,²⁴ — between which, by definition, there is no inter-

²⁰ *Nihāyat*, p. 180, ll. 8-12.

²¹ Cf. above, p. 199.

²² *Nihāyat*, p. 137, ll. 6-12.

²³ *Metaph.* IV, 7, 1011b, 23-24.

²⁴ *De Interpr.* 6, 17a, 31-37.

mediate, does the Law of Excluded Middle apply, so that one cannot say: "A neither is black nor is not black." But in the case of "contraries" (*ἑναντία*), between which, by definition, there are intermediates, the Law of Excluded Middle does not apply, so that one can say: "A neither is black nor is white" or "A neither is just nor is unjust."²⁵ Now, inasmuch as modes have a conceptual existence which is intermediate between the existence of real beings and the nonexistence of verbal beings, the proposition that "modes are neither existent nor nonexistent" does not violate the Law of Excluded Middle.

So much for the Mu'tazilite opposition to modes. Now for the orthodox opposition.

The chief exponent of the opposition to modes from among the orthodox attributists was Ash'arī. As restated by Shahrastānī in his *Milal*, Ash'arī begins with a statement that all those in Islam who participated in the discussion of the problem of attributes begin with the common premise that there is a Creator who is to be described as powerful and knowing and willing.²⁶ He then proceeds to argue that these three terms predicated of God must differ from each other in meaning,²⁷ whence, he wants us to conclude, they must differ also from the essence of God of which they are predicated. The question, therefore, is only as to what the nature of that difference is. Three alternative answers are enumerated by him. The predicates may be each either (1) a mere word (*lafẓ*), which is the view of Jubbā'ī, or (2) a mode (*ḥāl*), which is the view of Abū Hāshim, or (3) a real attribute (*ṣifah*),²⁸ the view which he himself is going to defend, after he has refuted both Jubbā'ī and Abū Hāshim.

In his criticism of Jubbā'ī, Ash'arī contends that distinctions conceived by the mind reflect certain realities which are quite independent of the words by which these distinctions are

²⁵ *Categ.* 10, 12a, 9-25.

²⁶ *Milal*, p. 66, ll. 3-8; cf. similar argument in Ash'arī's *Luma'* 3, 13, 14, 18, and 23.

²⁷ *Milal*, p. 66, ll. 15-19.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, ll. 19-20.

expressed, and so distinctions cannot be mere words. To quote: "The intellect determines what difference of meaning there is between two concepts, and were it supposed that there was no word at all, the intellect would still be in no doubt [as to the meaning of the differences] in its conceptions."²⁹ This is exactly like the Modalists' argument against the view that universals are mere words as quoted by Rāzī.³⁰

In his criticism of Abū Hāshim, Ash'arī repeats the argument already raised by the Mu'tazilites against the theory of modes,³¹ namely, that it is contrary to the Law of Excluded Middle. His argument, as reported by Shahrastānī, reads as follows: "The assumption of an attribute which can be described neither by existence nor by nonexistence is the assumption of something which is in the middle between existence and nonexistence, between affirmation and negation, but this is something absurd."³²

With the elimination of these two alternative possibilities, Ash'arī is left with the third possibility, namely, the old orthodox conception of attributes as being real things subsisting in God from eternity.

V. THE SEMANTIC ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM OF ATTRIBUTES *

The problem of divine attributes in the Kalam has a two-fold aspect, an ontological and a semantic aspect. A third aspect, a logical one, was introduced later by those who are called "Philosophers," as distinguished from those known as "Mutakallimūn."¹

²⁹ *Ibid.*, l. 20-p. 67, l. 2.

³⁰ *Muḥaṣṣal*, p. 39, ll. 9-12.

³¹ Cf. above at nn. 10-12.

³² *Milal*, p. 67, ll. 2-3.

* The part on the Antiattributists in this section (pp. 217 ff.) is reprinted here, with revisions, from *JAOS*, 79: 73-80 (1959), where it appeared under the title "Philosophical Implications of the Problems of Divine Attributes in the Kalam."

¹ Cf. my papers "Avicenna, Algazali, and Averroes on Divine Attributes,"